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COACHING IN THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL






The genesis for this article comes from a conversation with a National
Football League (NFL) club executive who complained that the information
he had at his disposal related to coaching compensation and contract terms
was incomplete, and he felt that it put him at a competitive disadvantage in
preparing for and handling negotiations with both his head coach and his
assistant coaches alike. A bit of investigation indicated that this executive was
far from alone in this feeling. It is in the negotiation of NFL coaching
contracts that clubs maintain less information and perhaps less leverage. This
is a particularly uncomfortable position for NFL clubs used to having strong
information and a standardized contract for their dealings with players. It
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National Football League (NFL) coaches crave information. The NFL coaching profession is
characterized by individuals uncommonly dedicated to study, analysis, structure and attention to
myriad detail, requisite qualities in the disciplined choreography of talented, though frequently
mercurial, professional football players. Accomplished (read: employed) NFL executives share these
qualities. Ironically, the employment market for NFL coaches, whose participants include both
groups, is relatively uninformed and uncoordinated. For NFL coaches, this discrepancy becomes
more pronounced as the ever-increasing commitment required to succeed in their public profession
provides them commensurately less time to study the fundamentals of their personal business. In this
market, NFL executives fare no better. It makes little sense then that these two groups of information
seekers, so accountable to and dependent on others - networks, owners, players and fans - have yet to
employ permissible means to achieve an informed marketplace.
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becomes critical then to examine the factors that have led to this perceived
imbalance, particularly when some of the best run and most sophisticated
organizations in professional sports, NFL franchises, believe they have
reached a competitive disadvantage. Does such an imbalance tilting in favor
of coaches and their representatives exist? Or is it merely limited to a few
highly sought-after coaching candidates who have the power to create a
different market? Or is there something elementally different between how
coaches are hired and how their contracts are negotiated than the way players
are acquired and their contracts are negotiated? What factors have contributed
to the present state of affairs regarding coaching contracts? This article seeks
possible explanations in the presently murky state of the unexplored area of
the NFL coaching market.
Part II of this article considers the legal and practical implications of
unionizing NFL coaches as a means for securing an intelligent marketplace
immune from antitrust scrutiny. Part III considers the marketplace for NFL
coaches. Part IV examines the NFL's Anti-Tampering Policy's impact on the
hiring process and its application to coaches vis a vis players. Part IV also
introduces the Rooney Rule. Part V provides an analysis of required, typical,
unique and glaringly absent provisions found (or not found) in most NFL
coaching contracts. Part VI offers a comprehensive analysis of NFL coaches'
current pension plans. Part VII reviews the governing legal principles of
sharing market information and posits a protocol for avoiding antitrust liability
in the context of disseminating accurate and detailed coaching contract
information among and between NFL coaches and NFL clubs. The Article
concludes with a simple observation.
II. LACK OF A COACHES UNION LIMITS ANTITRUST IMMUNIZATION
Several factors have contributed to the situation that the NFL executive
complained of. Some factors are purely market-based, which will be discussed
in detail later in this article, and some factors are caused by the intersection of
law and the market place. The first major factor based purely on law that
shapes the landscape of the coaching market is a simplistic one: NFL coaches
are not unionized like players. As such, the clubs dealings with them are not
given the benefit of the statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions to the
antitrust laws. 1
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision reversing Maurice
1. See Clarett v. National Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) for a discussion of the
history of the labor exemption to antitrust law in the National Football League.
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Clarett's challenge to the NFL draft2 because of the non-statutory labor
exemption and the Supreme Court's refusal to take up Clarett's appeal firmly
establish that courts give great deference to the subjects of collective
bargaining between unions and employers.3
The NFL Coaches Association (NFLCA), which operates out of the
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) offices in
Washington, DC, has been incorporated since 1996 as a 501(c)(5) not-for-
profit labor organization. 4 The NFLCA describes its mission as one of
"perpetuating and promoting the game of football and preserving its
integrity." 5 The NFLCA has involved itself in discussions with the NFL on
behalf of its members, more than 700 active and retired head and assistant
coaches, specifically in the area of the extension of health and retirement
benefits. 6 However, unlike the NFL players and their union, the NFLCA-
notwithstanding its being officed within the NFLPA headquarters-has never
sought to become certified and recognized as a union or attempted to
collectively bargain on behalf of its members.
If the coaches formed a union, they would have the ability to collectively
2. Id. Maurice Clarett, a star running back on Ohio State University's National Championship
football team during the 2002 season, had been suspended by the team, university and NCAA when
he sought to enter the NFL draft. Id. at 125-26. Clarett was only two years removed from high
school, and NFL eligibility rules required that he be three years removed from high school to be
eligible. Id. at 126. He brought an antitrust challenge to the NFL in the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Id. at 124.
It was a challenge described by Duke University law professor Paul Haagen as "a strong
antitrust case." Haagen said, "In the United States, any attempt by competitors to restrain competition
in the labor market is regarded by the courts with great suspicion. Unless the restraint falls under a
limited number of narrow exceptions, it will be treated as a violation of the antitrust laws." Keith
Lawrence, News Tip: NFL Faces Difficult Fight in Clarett Case, Sept. 23, 2003,
http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/2003/09/haagentip923.html. For the NFL to succeed in this case
Haagen opined, "[I]t will need to demonstrate either that its rule falls within the Rule of Reason, and
in fact enhances competition, or that it is incorporated by reference in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the league and the Players' Association and thus is protected by the non-statutory
labor exemption to the antitrust laws .... It will be a difficult argument for the league to sustain." Id.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision by District Judge Shira
Scheinlein in favor of Clarett and his application for entry into the NFL Draft. Despite some
scholarly predictions to the contrary, the Second Circuit found that the instant eligibility rule was
protected by the non-statutory labor exemption and thus immunized from antitrust challenge. See
Clarett, 369 F.3d 124 at 138.
3. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 544 U.S. 961 (2005).
4. See NFL Coaches Ass'n, About Us, http://www.nflcoaches.comabout.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2006) (describing the history of the organization).
5. NFL Coaches Ass'n, Overview, http://www.nflcoaches.com/overview.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2006).
6. See NFL Coaches Ass'n, History, http://www.nflcoaches.com/history.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2006). See also NFL Coaches Ass'n, supra note 4.
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bargain with the member clubs and both employers, and the union would have
access to information regarding wages, hours and working conditions related
to the collective bargaining process. But there is some question as to whether
coaches as managers legally can unionize, and market concerns may
demonstrate that it would be a disadvantageous proposition. The answers to
these questions, discussed in the subsequent sections, help explain why the
market for and contracts of NFL coaches vary so widely and why there exists
no uniform standard.
A. Unionization of NFL Coaches?
From an information standpoint, NFL clubs and NFL players are on even
ground when negotiating player contracts. The NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between the clubs and players expressly establishes certain
monetary terms (e.g., minimum salaries and post season pay) and allows for
the sharing of salary information among and between the clubs and players in
the context of negotiations. 7 It is important to note, however, that the NFL's
CBA also expressly prohibits certain collusive conduct. 8 Unlike NFL players,
NFL coaches and franchises do not enjoy the virtually limitless access to
current and historical salary information that NFL players access via their
union.9 And, unlike the men they coach, NFL coaches are not likely to secure
more complete salary information through unionization.
Coaches may be unable to unionize because "[s]upervisors and managerial
employees are excluded from the categories of employees entitled to the
benefits of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act."'10
Coaches could be excluded because they are considered either managers or
supervisors.
[The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)] requires the resolution of
three questions; and each must be answered in the affirmative if an
employee is deemed to be a supervisor. First, does the employee have
authority to engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities [in 29 U.S.C. §
152(11)]? Second, does the exercise of that authority require "the use
of independent judgment"? Third, does the employee hold the
7. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2002-2008 (2002).
8. Id. art. XXVIII. Among other proscribed conduct, NFL clubs may not enter into agreements
to restrict or limit individual club decision-making (e.g., whether or not to negotiate with players or
submit offer sheets).
9. The National Football League Players Association's (NFLPA) website, www.NFLPA.org,
provides NFL players and their agents a wealth of current, historical and supplemental contract
information integral to the negotiation of NFL player contracts.
10. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 674 (1980).
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authority "in the interest of the employer"?11
Coaches engage in many of the activities outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
Namely, coaches can suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign, reward and
discipline employees, which includes not only players but other coaches and
staff as well. The second requirement - use of independent judgment - is
obvious with coaches since the coach is the person held responsible for most
decisions, especially those concerning whom to play and not to play and how
individual units adjust during games. The third requirement, "in the interest of
the employer," may be a little problematic since it is possible to argue that
coaches are working in the interest of the players or for themselves and not
just for the employer. However, this argument was not successful in the past
and is unlikely to succeed in the context of coaching. In NLRB v. Health Care
& Retirement Corp.,12 head nurses claimed that they were not supervisors
since they worked in the interest of the patients and not for the employer. 13
The Court thought otherwise and held that the nurses were supervisors.
Ultimately, the Court found that the interest of the employer was also the
patients', and thus, the nurses were working in the interest of the employer. 14
In this light, the interest of the coach and the employer would be a successful
team, and therefore, like the nurses, coaches are supervisors.
Under the foregoing analysis, coaches appear to be supervisory in nature
and excluded from the ability to form a bargaining unit under the NLRA.
Coaches can also be considered managerial employees who are exempt
from the NLRA. "Managerial employees are defined as those who 'formulate
and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the
decisions of their employer."' 15 The status of this type of employee was not
addressed in the NLRA because it was considered "so clearly outside the Act
that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary."' 16
"Managerial employees must exercise discretion within, or even independently
of, established employer policy and must be aligned with management." 17
These employees are excluded because of the concern for the loyalty of
11. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1994). See also 29 U.S.C. §
152(11) (2006).
12. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 575.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 577-78
15. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 682 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288
(1974)).
16. Id. (quoting NLRB, 416 U.S. at 283).
17. Id. at 683.
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management staff between the company and the union. 18 The Supreme Court
clarified this standard in NLRB v. Yeshiva University. 19 In that case, the Court
addressed whether faculty members at a university were considered
management.20 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) argued that the
faculty was not management because it exercised independent judgment, but
the Yeshiva Court rejected this test as a way of determining management
status.21 The Court determined that the faculty members were management
because the authority exercised by the faculty would be considered managerial
in any other situation, and their unique status as faculty, with the ability to
make independent judgments, did not alter this determination.22
Thus, coaches appear to be excluded from the NLRA as managers.
Coaches maintain influence and authority to decide who plays, what system to
run, who should be drafted and who should be hired as assistant coaches,
among other decisions. If a person that controlled these decisions would be
allowed to form a bargaining unit, his loyalty to the unit/union would affect
his ability to make decisions that represent the organization. The arguments
against qualifying coaches as a recognized bargaining unit finds increased
support where a coach, particularly a head coach, is charged with the duties of
a general manager.
An argument could be made for some assistant coaches to be deemed non-
supervisory based upon the foregoing. However, coordinators who formulate
and direct the activities of eleven players at one time and play a role in play
calling would most assuredly be deemed excluded. Pat Kirwan, a respected
NFL commentator who was also the director of contract administration for the
New York Jets, suggests that unionization might be a disadvantageous
proposition because the coaching salary market is set from the top down and
position coaches and assistant position coaches who might be deemed non-
supervisory would lose the leverage they currently enjoy.23 Kirwan suggests
that the expansion of the head coaching market in recent years to include a
number of elite college coaching jobs-in 2006, forty-two college football
coaches will earn more than $1 million24-has helped create greater
competition for the services of top head coaches and head coaching candidates
18. Id. at 684.
19. Id. at 672.
20. Id. at 674.
21. Id. at 684.
22. Id. at 686.
23. Interview with Pat Kirwan, Senior Analyst, NFL.com (July 21, 2006).
24. Michael McCarthy & Steve Wieberg, Reviled or Loved, Agents Get Results, USA TODAY,
Nov. 17, 2006.
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(predominately, NFL coordinators). 25 Likewise, since head coaches largely
pick their staff, there are more opportunities for assistant coaches to make
contractual gains because there are more competitors. Kirwan suggests that
coaches work in a freer market than do players.26
Thus, with many coaches likely excluded from the protections of the
NLRA as either a supervisor or a manager, it would seem that unionization
would not be possible for the best paid coaches and would be available only to
those who command the least market power. According to Kirwan,
unionization of only those coaches eligible for collective bargaining might
have the unintended effect of setting a wage scale where none already exists,
as position coaches and assistant coaches have limited or less power to
negotiate their terms already.27 With barriers to unionization of coaches being
both legal and practical, the sharing of information about coaches is restricted.
Without the benefit of the statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions, it is
not permissible for teams to share salary and contractual information with one
another in the manner similar to the way player salary and contractual
information is disseminated and published, as it would potentially trigger
antitrust violations and the possibility of a conspiracy that would make treble
damages possible. 28
III. A MORE COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE
A. Player Restrictions
Coaches in the NFL may well operate in a less restrictive labor market
than NFL players because teams are prohibited from sharing information and
having information as a result of the collective bargaining process. It is also
clear that NFL players do have several external restrictions on their contracts,
25. Id. Kirwan points to the movement of NFL coaches to college and the economics of college
coaching salaries as creating greater competition for the services of head coaches. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). The circuit court discusses the
origin of the labor exemption for concerted activity between unions and employers.
Although "[tihe interaction of the [antitrust laws] and federal labor legislation is an area of law
marked r.ore by controversy than by clarity," it has long been recognized that in order to
accommodate the collective bargaining process, certain concerted activity among and between
labor and employers must be held to be beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. Courts, therefore,
have carved out two categories.
Id. at 130 (citing Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted)).
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most notably team salary cap provisions. All player contracts are standardized
except for signing bonus language and addenda to various publicity rights. 29
The newly agreed upon NFL CBA will create even more standardization of
language in the area of bonus clauses after significant grievance activity in this
area.30 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, NFL player compensation and
freedom of movement is subject to team and league salary cap rules and free
agency rules that limit how teams spend and structure player contracts and
when players may move from team to team. 31
B. Contributing Factors to the Coaching Market's Growth
With regard to coaching talent, NFL teams may actually be part of a
bigger labor market with the addition of college teams seeking NFL
experienced coaches, and there may exist more competition for proven
coaches than for players. Several factors influence this. First, the number of
coaches believed to have the ability to lead franchises to success are less
numerous than talented players based only on sheer number. Furthermore, in
the last decade, top college programs have begun paying on a scale equal to
the NFL, thus expanding the market to include not just thirty-two NFL head
coaching and sixty-four coordinator positions but to also embrace perhaps as
many as thirty additional high profile collegiate positions that are competitors
29. See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 7, app. C, Standard NFL Player Contract
(containing only minor adjustments for choice of law and blanks for salary and years in length).
30. Ashley Fox, Under New Labor Deal, Players Get the Edge, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jun.
18, 2006, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/sports/14842925.htm.
According to a high-level official at an NFC team, when the NFL Players Association presented
the league with its final take-it-or-leave-it collective bargaining agreement in March, the Players
Association added a section regarding signing bonuses. Under the previous CBA, each team could
negotiate what is called signing bonus forfeiture language. The teams could put in strict deterrents -
in the form of dollars - for behavior it deemed risky, like skiing or riding a motorcycle.
Under the new CBA, clubs now can recoup only 23.5 percent of a player's signing bonus prorated
for one season, the team source said. And that goes for players who test positive for drugs, commit
a crime, or hold out of mandatory team activities, the source said.
"You see baseball moving toward a 50-game suspension for steroid use," the source said. "You see
the NBA and their union agreeing to things like a dress code. And here you have the NFL and the
union, which historically have had this positive relationship looking out for the best interest of the
game. I don't think it's in the best interest of the game to minimize the penalties for steroid use,
holdouts, or motorcycle accidents. The union's comeback is, 'We agree there should be a deterrent,
but we believe the old deterrent is onerous, just too much."'
Id.
31. See Five Smiths, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 788 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Minn.
1992); NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 7, arts. XIX, XXIV.
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for coaching talent and not for player talent.32 Second, the majority of
successful coaches are represented by a small group of agents and lawyers, so
information regarding contracts is closely guarded. Finally, the market has
been subject to great volatility, with as many as one-third of the NFL's
franchises making broad leadership changes in the last year. These changes
have created, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, a sellers market with
multiple NFL teams pursuing a finite number of available candidates, much
like free agency has done for star players. Additionally, since the
implementation of the NFL salary cap in 1993, coaching compensation has
grown dramatically; it has become the area where ownership can seek
unrestricted coaching resources to better manage financially limited player
resources. 33 The stunning growth in coordinator compensation exists because
teams have begun using highly skilled coaches as a hedge against capped
player spending. 34
With so much financially at stake, one would expect the contract process
for coaches to be as sophisticated as the player contract negotiation process.
However, the executive's comment at the beginning of this article and a
review of the process indicates that it is a process that teams approach
somewhat unarmed and feeling overwhelmed.
C. Recognition of Coaching Overdue
With players in a salary capped structure scheduled to earn $102 million
under the 2006 salary cap35 and franchise values in excess of $1 billion,36
Kirwan suggests that compensating the individuals who direct the activities of
fifty-three players and the various sub-units of the team is an idea that is
somewhat overdue. "Paying individual players with contracts that are valued
in the hundreds of millions," Kirwan said, "makes it clear that paying coaches
32. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23. Kirwan's comments are supported by those of
Bob LaMonte, agent for seven NFL head coaches and Notre Dame's Charlie West, who regards the
current market place for head coaches as including not only the thirty-two NFL teams, but also as
many as twenty top collegiate positions. Interview with Bob LaMonte, Founder and President of
Professional Sports Representation, Inc. (Nov. 16, 2006).
33. Tom Weir, Big Bucks, No Security for Coordinators on Both Ends, USA TODAY, Aug. 12,
2005, at 1C, available at http://usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2005-08- 1-nfl-notes_x.htm.
34. See, e.g., Pat Kirwan, Summer Reading: The Greatest Game Changers, July 7, 2006,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/9544216 (referring to Alex Gibbs as the eighth person who changed
the modem game in the NFL the most); Pat Kirwan, Offensive Line a Complicated Need, Apr. 15,
2005, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/8387948 ("Renowned line specialists like Alex
Gibbs and Jim McNally would prefer second-day picks that they choose themselves.").
35. John Clayton, Salary Cap Status of All 32 Teams, ESPN.COM, Mar. 10, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2349505.
36. See Forbes 2005 NFL Franchise Valuations, FORBES, Sept. 19, 2005, at 122.
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who direct units on the team more than the veteran [player] minimum is an
easy decision." 37 The NFLCA indicates that owners are just now embracing
this concept, as NFL coaches' salaries collectively are only edging over the
NFL rookie player minimum contract of $275,000 as of 2006.38
The recent and somewhat overdue escalation of coaching compensation
has not occurred solely on the basis of the market recognizing the value of
coaching but rather because several factors have coalesced to drive the
marketplace forward. Kirwan points to the implementation of the player
salary cap as the turning point where club owners and high level managers
began looking to acquire coaching talent as a tool, not regulated by the salary
cap, to gain a competitive edge.39 Kirwan has written on several occasions
regarding the hiring of a particularly experienced position coach or
coordinator enabling an organization to operate with less costly players, more
cap-friendly players, or both. Offensive line coach Alex Gibbs, now of the
Atlanta Falcons and formerly of the Denver Broncos, has been hailed as an
example of one who can produce a superior unit because of the scheme he
employs rather than the individual skills of his players.40 Similarly, a great
deal of the success of the New England Patriots has been attributed to the
innovative coaching of Bill Belichick and his staff who use schemes and team
concepts rather than the overwhelming superiority of their players. 41 The
recognition that head coaches are significant may have come when free agency
became prevalent, according to Kirwan, and it was the head coaches who
remained as players moved on.42 Assistant coaches became more important
when player salaries became capped. So, are coaches at all levels just talent
that are part of a moveable, broader competitive marketplace?
D. Expansion of the Coaching Market
The decision in Five Smiths, Inc. v. National Football League Players
Ass'n 43 recognized that professional sports' labor markets are far from truly
free.44 Players enter in certain strata and their earning power is based upon
37. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23.
38. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COACHES ASS'N, SALARY SuRvEy (2006).
39. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23.
40. See sources cited supra note 34.
41. Robert Boland, Playing Moneyball to Win, Paper Presented to Int'l Conference on Sports and
Entm't Businesses, Columbia, S.C. (2005).
42. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23.
43. Five Smiths, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 788 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Minn. 1992).
44. Id. at 1053 (rejecting NFL argument that exchange of player compensation data and
information regarding current offers by agents and the decertified NFLPA violated Section 1 of the
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their movement from one strata to another, for example, from drafted rookie to
starting player to potential free agent. Similarly, the coaching market in the
NFL was not as free as it is currently until several trends changed the
landscape of collegiate football in the last decade. Kirwan points to a number
of significant changes that enabled coaches who had been associated with the
professional game to move seamlessly to college football, thereby expanding
the market for coaching talent.45 Previously, said Kirwan, "It was recruiting
that drove college coaches to the pros," referring to the overwhelming pressure
to bring in top quality student-athletes as recruits. 46 "Now, it is recruiting of
free agents that is driving pro coaches back to college. 47 Kirwan clarifies this
statement by saying that the National Collegiate Athletic Association's
(NCAA) rules governing recruiting have reduced the amount of contact that
coaches can have with prospective student-athletes, consequently reducing the
time college head coaches must devote to recruiting.48 At the same time,
Kirwan points out that the NFL has become much more of a 365-day
business.49
Camps open in July. The regular season ends in January, giving way
to the playoffs and to the evaluation of draft prospects in January and
February. The free agent signing period opens in March. April brings
the draft and another flurry of free agent signing. The months of May
and June bring mini-camps and off-season conditioning. July brings
negotiations of draft choice contracts and training camp opens again.50
Kirwan suggests that many of these duties rest not only on the shoulders
of head coaches but also now fall on coordinators and position coaches who,
in the era of free agency, are increasingly involved in recruiting players to
their team.51
E. NFL Experience Becoming a Decided Advantage in the NCAA Ranks
As pressures in collegiate coaching have eased and NFL coaching burdens
have mounted, the fluidity with which coaches move from the NFL to college
has increased. Kirwan cites the collaborative nature of the NFL, where
Sherman Act).
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owners, general managers and personnel all weigh in on critical decisions as a
key motivating factor. "You get to pick your own players in college and you
don't have to manage a cap." 52 The success of Pete Carroll at the University
of Southern California and Nick Saban at Louisiana State University, both
experienced NFL coaches before moving to the college ranks, has created a
perception that having a coach with NFL experience provides the school with
an edge in recruiting and coaching. Syracuse Athletic Director Daryl Gross, in
announcing the hiring of former veteran NFL defensive coordinator Greg
Robinson, publicly noted this perceived recruiting advantage and conducted an
extensive national search for "a defensive-minded [head] coach with both NFL
and college experience." 53  Kirwan puts it succinctly, "Top high school
players aspire to play in the NFL and whom better than an NFL-experienced
coach to help guide them toward that goal."54 Recent professional coaches
taking jobs in the collegiate ranks include not only Carroll, Saban and
Robinson, but also Bill Callahan from the Oakland Raiders to the University
of Nebraska, Karl Dorrell from the Denver Broncos to UCLA, Charlie Weis
from the New England Patriots to the University of Notre Dame, Dave
Wannstedt from the Miami Dolphins to the University of Pittsburgh and, even
though he is better known as a collegiate coach, Steve Spurrier from the
Washington Redskins to the University of South Carolina. "In the PAC-10
alone, five head coaches have significant NFL experience: Oregon State's
Mike Riley was the Chargers' coach; USC's Pete Carroll coached the Patriots
and the New York Jets; Standford's Walt Harris was the Jets' quarterbacks
coach; UCLA's Karl Dorrell coached receivers with the Denver Broncos; and
Washington's Tyrone Willingham was a Minnesota Vikings running backs
coach., 5 5 The door also swings back the other way as Saban has returned to
the NFL ranks as head coach and head of football operations for the Miami
Dolphins. And, with 2006 regular season games still remaining for the
Arizona Cardinals and the University of Southern California (USC) Trojans, it
has already been reported that Pete Carroll has received "feelers" about his
interest in coaching the Cardinals in 2007.56
52. Id.
53. Jay Cox, New Game Plan: Veteran Coach Greg Robinson Aims to Take SU Football to New
Heights, SYRACUSE UNIV. MAG., Spring 2005, available at http://sumagazine.syr.edu/spring05/
sports/index.html.
54. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23.
55. Peter King, The Rookie, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 13, 2006, at 55.
56. Carroll Could Replace Green as Head Coach, KFFL.COM, Nov. 26, 2006,
http://www.kffl.com/popuphotw.php?id=362335. Oklahoma University Head Football Coach Bob
Stoops is also identified as a potential replacement for the Cardinals' Dennis Green. Stoops Could
Become Team's Next Head Coach, KFFL.COM, Nov. 26, 2006, http://www.kffl.com/popuphotw.
[Vol. 17:1
COACHING IN THE NFL
The movement of Jim Herrmann this year is illustrative of what may be a
new path to ascending to collegiate head coaching positions. After twenty
seasons at the University of Michigan, the last nine as defensive coordinator,
Herrmann, whose tenure at Michigan was highlighted by a national title in
1997 and the Frank Broyles Award for the top assistant coach on the collegiate
level, seemingly made a downward move to become the linebackers coach of
the New York Jets.5 7 Herrmann, just forty-five years of age and a former
Michigan standout player, would seem to have the resume that would mark
him as an excellent candidate for virtually any collegiate head coaching
vacancy in recent years, and yet, he made the move to become a position
coach in the NFL without getting serious head coaching consideration.
Herrmann may be proving Syracuse's Gross and Kirwan correct in that career
college coaches must now pay NFL dues to be considered candidates for top
vacancies in the NCAA. Similarly, only three of the ten winners of the annual
Broyles Award as the top assistant in college football coaching have become a
collegiate head coach, providing some evidence that the advantage in the
pursuit of college football head coaching jobs now lies with NFL coaches. 58
The net of this movement has expanded the number of jobs an NFL coach can
consider and potentially the number of bidders for his services. 59 And with
approximately seventy percent of major colleges running and defending
against pro-style offenses, the skill sets of NFL and major college coaches are
gradually becoming more fungible,60 a circumstance that expands the job
market for professional and college coaches alike.
F. More Jobs, More Competition for Top Talent
The expansion of the coaching marketplace also expands the role of agents
or representatives for a coach in both charting the coach's career and in
seeking out potential opportunities and offers for their clients. Bob LaMonte,
php?id=362339.
57. Jim Herrman Biography, http://www.newyorkjets.com/coaches/jim-herrmann/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2006).
58. Past Winners, http://www.broylesaward.com/html/about.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
Only three winners have become head coaches: Mark Mangino (2000), Ralph Friedgen (1999) and
David Cutcliffe (1998). The most recent winner to become a head coach was Mangino at Kansas in
2001, and no winner has become a collegiate head coach since.
59. Ted Miller, College Coaches Breathe Easier, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 12, 2005,
at D1. College coaches' compensations at elite programs are benchmarked at $1.5 million annually,
and they enjoy a modicum of stability as 2005 did not include a marquee firing and coaching search.
60. King, supra note 55 (Experienced and respected NFL journalist Peter King observes that the
increasing similarities between the NFL and major college football account for the considerable
number of coaches moving back and forth between college and the pros these days.).
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a coaches agent based in Reno, Nevada, is considered one of the most
influential people in his field. He has been featured on 60 Minutes and has
written a book, Winning the NFL Way: Leadership Lessons from Football's
Top Coaches, that has been featured as a text in college classes on
leadership. 61 LaMonte has specialized in getting his clients opportunities in
the NFL, representing seven current NFL coaches. 62  But, after the 2004
season, LaMonte assisted perhaps his hottest NFL assistant, New England
offensive coordinator Charlie Weis, in securing the vacant head coaching
position at the University of Notre Dame. Weis had previously been a
contender for several head coaching vacancies in the NFL after coordinating
New England's offense during three Super Bowl victories in four years. But
he opted instead to return to his alma mater to revive fortunes of the fabled
South Bend, Indiana school. He was so successful that LaMonte convinced
Notre Dame to extend Weis's original contract after only seven games into his
first season.63  It was in no small part because LaMonte successfully
convinced Notre Dame of the prospective NFL interest in Weis after his fast
start. 64 So for LaMonte and another leading coaches agent, Gary O'Hagan,
who is believed to represent many current NFL and collegiate clients,65 the
threat of more potential employers (both in the NCAA and the NFL) making
viable offers to their clients makes their jobs easier. Additionally, colleges
offer another level of competition as they are not subject to the NFL's
restrictions on tampering (discussed in detail later in this article) and thus are
free to speak to coaches about their vacancies without limitation.
61. BOB LAMONTE & ROBERT SHOOK, WINNING THE NFL WAY: LEADERSHIP LESSONS FORM
FOOTBALL'S TOP HEAD COACHES (2004).
62. Prof'l Sports Representation, Inc., Clientele, http://www.psr-inc.net/index.php?click=
clientele (last visited Sept. 29, 2006) (listing seven current NFL head coaches: Brad Childress
(Minnesota); John Fox (Carolina); Jon Gruden (Tampa Bay); Mike Holmgren (Seattle); Jim Mora
(Atlanta); Mike Nolan (San Francisco) and Andy Reid (Philadelphia), fourteen current NFL
coordinators or assistant head coaches, and nine management personnel as clients).
63. Univ. of Notre Dame Official Athletic Site, Charlie Weis Contract Extension Statement, Oct.
30, 2005, http://und.cstv.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/103005aaa.html; Pro Sports Representation,
Inc., http://psr-inc.net/index.php?click=clientele (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
64. Id. Weis concedes he knew "people would start talking about things like the NFL." Id.
65. Liz Mullen, IMG Coaches Agent O'Hagen Adds First NBA Client and is Looking for More,
SPORTS BUS. J.., Sept. 29, 2003. Mullen writes that "[slince coming to IMG in December 2000,
O'Hagan has built an impressive practice representing NFL coaches." Id. O'Hagan refuses to say
how many he represents but Mullen lists Marty Schottenheimer, Jack Del Rio, Dennis Green, Tom
Coughlin and former coaches Steve Mariucci and Bill Callahan, now at Nebraska, as clients. Id.
Kansas City's Herman Edwards has also been attributed to being an O'Hagan client. Rich Cimini,
Over & Out, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 1, 2006, at 50.
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G. Too Much Influence, Too Much Information
With LaMonte and O'Hagan representing nearly half (currently fourteen
or fifteen) of the thirty-two NFL head coaches and an increasing number of
coordinators and collegiate coaches, the question becomes, do they have too
much influence, too much information and too much ability to play the interest
of market participants against one another? Sports Pickle, a web sports satire,
in a mocking column wrote, after LaMonte succeeded in getting Weis an
extension after only seven games, that if Notre Dame had a halftime lead in its
bowl game, LaMonte would have thirty-five NFL offers awaiting Weis (never
minding there are only thirty-two NFL teams), unless he got yet another new
contract from Notre Dame.66 USA Today quoted O'Hagan as saying, with
coordinators, "I think you've developed a segment of the market which is
almost like a three- or four-star general. He may not be the commander in
chief, but he's extremely valuable." 67  This may be because agents have
successfully promoted their coordinator clients and successfully used the
interest of other teams both in the NFL and college to cause their salaries to
jump dramatically, as the USA Today story credits LaMonte for achieving for
his client, then Jet offensive coordinator Mike Heimerdinger.
Coordinators' salaries have skyrocketed since the 2001 NFLCA survey
placed the average pay for coordinators at less than $350,000.68 Entering the
2005 NFL season, agents could point to about fifteen coordinators earning
more than $1 million dollars.69 Perhaps the phrase agents "could point to" is
meaningful as Weir could not get team sources to confirm these numbers and
rather relied upon the agents. This is at least anecdotal evidence that the
agents may have better information than the clubs because of the antitrust
restrictions and competitive relationship between the market participants.
There is no evidence that agents have cooperated with one another in a Five
Smiths scenario.70 LaMonte, O'Hagan and the others who have NFL clients
appear to be in serious competition with one another.
Incomplete information resulting from certain teams being rumored to
deny their coaches permission to participate or inaccurate reporting is a
problem for both sides unless there are .multiple interested bidders on the
franchise level. It stands to reason that if one person represents multiple
66. Charlie Weis to Receive Contract Extension If Irish Lead Fiesta Bowl at Halftime, Dec. 21,
2005, http://www.sportspickle.com/features/volume5/2005-1221 -weis.html.
67. Weir, supra note 33.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Five Smiths, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 788 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Minn.
1992).
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clients in the same position, as head coaches, coordinators or position coaches,
he or she would have increased knowledge, but Kirwan suggests that
benchmarking amongst colleagues is a common practice in the league. 71
As to the issue of the influence of agents, there is no power in an auction
market unless there are bidders, Kirwan suggests. 72 Saying that an agent's
influence does not exist "until someone (a team owner or athletic director)
calls wanting to hire [his or her] client," Kirwan downplayed the agent's
power and knowledge in comparison to the clubs. 73 While questioning the
overall influence of agents, he does suggest that some, like LaMonte, are very
successful at leveraging opportunities for their clients and getting their clients
media attention. 74
H. A Different Posture from Ownership
Another key difference, Kirwan suggests, is that owners and team
management take a different posture with regard to coaching contract
negotiations than they do with regard to player contracts. 75 Owners play an
active role in the selection of the head coach, and they, as LaMonte indicates,
do not like to not get their first choice. 76 In the capped world of player
contracts, it is becoming apparent that the best available player in the irrational
market of free agency is not always the best fit for a team with salary cap
restraints. 77 Enlightened owners can now see the wisdom of passing on a
player who will tilt their salary cap away from competitiveness. However,
owners do not want to face the public embarrassment based upon unending
newspaper and sports radio speculations of failing to secure the head coach of
their choice. 78 Accordingly, contract negotiators at the general manager level
or lower may not have the authority or discretion to not get a deal done with a
coach. Kirwan suggests that this mandate to "get the candidate" also trickles
down with regard to position coaches and coordinators. 79 "It is not acceptable





76. Bob LaMonte, Speech to Leadership Class at New York University (Dec. 11, 2003).
77. Boland, supra note 41.
78. Kurt Kragthorpe, Donovan Made Big Assist with Meyer Recruitment, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec.
7, 2004, at B I. Florida's Athletic Director, hoping to avoid the public spectacle involving his
unsuccessful recruitment of Mike Shanahan and Bob Stoops, flew from Vermont and then chartered
to Utah in his successful recruitment of Urban Meyer in 2004.
79. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23.
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in most cases to come back to the owner or team executive and say the coach
wants too much, I lost him," Kirwan says. With coordinators at the "three- or
four-star general" level as O'Hagan suggests, owners may not be in a position
to "say no" to most of their demands. 80 Similarly, Kirwan indicates that most
head coaches insist on forming their staffs, so again, the teams do not have
real ability to deny their new commanders in chief the opportunity to decide
who will assist them.81 This may help to explain some of the frustration the
team executive, mentioned earlier, spoke of in describing his feeling of being
unarmed. Rather than being unarmed, the negotiator has been disarmed
because he or she has, for the most part, lost the leverage of passing on a
candidate.
L A Strategic Turn
Kirwan also echoes O'Hagan's quote from USA Today, "[I]f the owner
really wants to make a difference, the one place he can do it is by spending
more money on his coaching staff."82 The example of Washington Redskins
owner Daniel Snyder, who has the most valuable team ($1.264 billion) and
highest annual revenues ($287 million) of any NFL team, is illustrative.8 3 The
Redskins in the past two off-seasons added coordinators at salaries believed to
be in excess of $2 million annually.84 This may be a strategic move from an
owner seeking to press his obvious advantage against his competitors. While
Snyder may have virtually unlimited resources to enlarge his coaching staff,
competitors' valuations equal to half the Redskins' valuation and revenues of
more than $100 million less may have real difficulty matching this pace,
allowing Snyder to accumulate great talent and push his competitors to make
costly mistakes. 85 Kirwan calls this "Steinbrennerism," based on baseball's
New York Yankees owner's strategy for collecting and continuing to maintain
top players because other teams cannot match his payroll. If Snyder is using
"Steinbrennerism" to gain an advantage on his fellow owners and competitors,
it represents a decided market shift away from the trend on the players side
80. Weir, supra note 33.
81. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23.
82. Weir, supra note 33.
83. See Forbes 2005 NFL Franchise Valuations, supra note 36, at 122.
84. See John Clayton, Redskins Hire Saunders as Offensive Coordinator, Jan. 19, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2298365; Len Pasquarelli, Gray Added to All-Star Staff
as Secondary Coach, Jan. 30, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2311954.
85. The number 26-32 ranked franchises are valued at less than $700 million and annual
revenues for teams ranked number 18-32 are at less than $187 million dollars or more than $100
million less than Washington. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23; Forbes 2005 NFL
Franchise Valuations, supra note 36, at 122.
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where owners are urged to eschew free agents using a "Moneyball"
approach.8 6 But "Steinbrennerism" impacts the marketplace in many ways.
Owners will overpay, fearing they will lose candidates to lesser-titled offers87
by teams like Washington. Similarly, owners, and by extension colleges, will
be forced to match the market Washington sets, and it will impact their
spending in other areas.
J. Who Is Hurt By More Information
If clubs are possibly helped by more freely disseminated information, will
there be an injured party, possibly the agents or even the colleges? With
regard to agents, LaMonte is fairly forceful in answering that he will not be
hurt by broader knowledge, stating that the foundation of his client
relationships is trust, boldness and fiduciary duty.88
In fact, if negotiators have lost the ability to say no, as it appears, and with
the informal benchmarking that is common in the NFL, negotiations that must
end in the acquisition of coaching talent will rise as long as there are multiple
bidders. Colleges may have something greater at stake as staff salaries rise,
but again, as long as salaries serve as a market broadening force, they will
remain vital as coaches continue to pass through college ranks and back to the
NFL in search of opportunities, as Nick Saban did in 2005, and others may do
after the 2006 season.
IV. NFL ANTI-TAMPERING POLICY
The NFL maintains a comprehensive Anti-Tampering Policy (Policy) that
establishes the framework for clubs to consider coaching candidates from its
most fertile and qualified candidate pool, current NFL coaches. Since most
NFL coaching positions are filled on or before the end of January, and most
NFL coaching contracts expire no less than a year from the date of hire, the
vast majority of NFL coaches interviewing for new jobs are under contract
with another team during this time. Consequently, the Policy is almost always
applicable to a current NFL coach. As club representatives, coaches are also
subject to the Policy's proscriptions regarding NFL players.
A. Background
The Policy, which applies to both players as well as non-players, was
86. Boland, supra note 41.
87. LaMonte, supra note 76 (emphasizing the notion of boldness, calling it a "sack").
88. Id.
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passed to act as a stabilizing force within the NFL. Tampering is defined as
"any interference by a member club with the employer-employee relationship
of another club or any attempt by a club to impermissibly induce a person to
seek employment with that club or with the NFL." 89 In relation to players, the
Policy's goal is to "protect member clubs' contract and negotiating rights"
while "allow[ing] the intra-League competitive systems devised for the
acquisition and retention of player talent . . . to operate efficiently."90
Moreover, as applied to non-players, the Policy serves to "strike a balance
between protecting the rights and maintaining the organizational stability of
employer clubs, and providing realistic advancement opportunities for
employees if other clubs desire their services." 91 Former NFL Commissioner
Paul Tagliabue, who issued the appropriate disciplinary measures at his
discretion,92 had on occasion enforced the Policy by issuing hefty fines and
draft pick compensation. 93 There exists, however, a significant grey area
within which potential player and coach free agents and their respective
representatives operate. 94
As the NFL has matured and developed, the Policy has undergone a
number of significant changes designed to address the current state of the
NFL. Specifically, the owners have recognized the need to "soften" the Policy
in order to provide greater opportunity for assistant head coaches to ascend in
the NFL, especially those of minority descent.95  Arguably, the Policy's
requirements have historically inhibited the rise of coaches within the NFL,
yet have; had 11jttic fciL;ct or plyes P~.Inp +1.- _- i
for this circumstance is that although the Policy prescribes strict and uniform
evidentiary standards for proving violations, evidence is easier to establish in
the cases involving coaches. 96 Notwithstanding, the Policy has served its
89. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL ANTI-TAMPERING POLICY 1 (1999).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS art. VIII, § 8.13(A) (amended 1999).
93. Rams Say They're Satisfied With Compensation, ESPN.COM, Jan. 11, 2001,
http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/2001/0111/1007828.html.
94. Len Pasquarelli, Anti-Tampering Rules Go Down the Drain at NFL Combine,
CBSSPORTSLINE.COM, Feb. 24, 2001, http://cbs.sportsline.com/b/page/pressbox/
0,1328,3564117,00.html.
95. Len Pasquarelli, Crennel Also Scheduled to Talk with Browns, ESPN.COM, Jan. 6, 2005,
http://proxy.espn.go.com/nfl/colurns/story?columnist=pasquarellijlen&id = 1961103;
Press Release, Nat'l Football League, NFL Clubs to Promote Diversity Program (Dec. 20, 2002),
available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story/6046016.
96. The evidentiary standards are the same for players, coaches, and employees. See Milloy:
Redskins Made Early Offer, ESPN.COM, Sept. 7, 2003, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?
id=1610564. Although the Washington Redskins may have been guilty of tampering by negotiating
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purpose of promoting integrity within the NFL by limiting instances of
tampering. 97 A brief review of the NFL's application of this Policy to players
and club employees is relevant and instructive for its application to coaches.
B. Application to Players
i. College Players
The Policy clearly limits the dialogue between NFL club personnel
(including coaches) and collegiate athletes who have yet to declare for the
draft. Specifically, personnel may not "attempt[] to induce underclassmen to
petition the League for special eligibility or to declare to the League their
desire to enter the League under the early-graduation rule." 98 Moreover, club
personnel are not allowed to make public comments detailing the "football
ability or NFL potential of underclassmen." 99
ii. NFL Players
Clubs are prohibited from tampering with NFL players who are "under
contract to or whose exclusive negotiating rights are held by another club."' 00
This can involve private meetings or conversations with a player under
contract or even public or private statements of interest in another club's
player.10' For example, in 2005, former Philadelphia Eagles wide receiver
Terrell Owens was suspended for four games and eventually deactivated for
with Lawyer Milloy's agent prior to his release from the New England Patriots, the NFL did not
punish the Redskins due to a lack of evidence.
97. See Milloy: Redskins Made Early Offer, supra note 96; NFL Fines Carmen Policy $10,000,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 1998, available at http://www2.jsonline.com/packer/sbxxxiii/
news/carmen120498.asp; Eagles File Tampering Complaint Against Cowboys, ESPN.COM, Nov. 28,
2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2238533; Rick Stroud, Bucs Want Compensation
for Right to Talk to Parcells, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 30, 2002, at IC, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/12/30/news-pf/Bucs/Bucswant-compensatio.shtml.
98. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 2. Student-athletes eligible under the early
graduation rule can still solicit the League prior to declaring for the NFL draft in January: "If four
seasons have not elapsed since the player discontinued high school, he is ineligible for selection, but
may apply to the Commissioner for special eligibility." Id. art. XII, § I(A). See Clarett v. Nat'l
Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding NFL's eligibility rules, which required Clarett
to have been more than three full college football seasons removed from high school in order to apply
for special eligibility, were shielded from antitrust laws and thus enforceable).
99. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 2.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 3. "Any public or private statement of interest, qualified or unqualified, in another
club's player to that player's agent or representative, or to a member of the news media, is a violation
of this Anti-Tampering Policy." Id.
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the remainder of the season. 10 2 While Owens was still suspended, Dallas
Cowboys owner Jerry Jones arguably expressed interest in signing the
controversial Owens during an interview on a local radio station. 10 3 The
Eagles subsequently filed a complaint claiming Jones's conduct was in
violation of the Policy.104 Although the Eagles eventually withdrew their
claim, the possible effect of Jones's words invoked what is at the heart of the
Policy. Under the Policy, if Owens was subsequently involved in a contract
dispute with the Eagles, the Cowboys could have been guilty of tampering
regardless of whether his dispute emanated from Jones's comments on the air:
"[T]ampering will be found even in the absence of a demonstrated cause-and-
effect relationship between the player's contract problems and his prior
involvement with the other club." 105 Communication between a club and a
player who could possibly be released is also a violation of the Policy. 106
Only when the player is released or becomes a free agent can the team discuss
employment.'0 7 In 2003, safety Lawyer Milloy stated in an interview that the
Washington Redskins negotiated and made an offer before he was released by
his then current team, the New England Patriots. 10 8 Milloy stated that his
agent, Carl Poston, had initiated contact with the Redskins. 10 9 This act was in
direct violation of the Policy which states:
If a club is contacted by a player (or his representative) who is under
contract to or whose negotiating rights are held by another club, and
such player had not been given permission to deal with other clubs, or
such player is not in a permissible negotiating period under the terms
of an operative collective bargaining agreement, then the contacted
club is prohibited from talking or otherwise dealing with the player or
102. Eagles File Tampering Complaint Against Cowboys, supra note 97.
103. Id. In response to whether the Cowboys may be interested in Owens, Jones stated, "In
general, I am a risk taker. We've gone down that road. I probably have a propensity to try and make
things work .... A top receiver could flourish with Drew Bledsoe. That's always appealing." Id.
104. Id.
105. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 2.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2-3.
108. Id. at 3; Peter King, Questionable Timing: NFL May Investigate Milloy's Contact with
Other Teams, CNNSI.coM., Sept. 7, 2003, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/writers/
peter-king/09/06/milloy.fallout/index.html. It is also a violation of the NFL's Anti-Tampering Policy
to contact a player or his agent when he still sits on waivers: "If a club is contacted by a player or his
representative during this period, the only permissible response by the club is to inform the player or
his representative that the club is not allowed under NFL rules to speak to him." NAT'L FOOTBALL
LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 3. Milloy most likely did not realize the impact of his words and the
possibility of the Patriots filing an anti-tampering claim.
109. King, supra note 108.
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his representative. 1 10
The Redskins subsequently denied the accusations, claiming they were
contacted only after Milloy was cut.111 If Milloy's statements were true, the
Patriots were disadvantaged in their negotiations with Milloy since the player
was emboldened with information that a lucrative offer awaited upon his
release. 112 Despite Milloy's statements confirming his agent's contact with
the Redskins, the NFL did nothing to punish the Redskins due to a lack of
evidence. 113  The Milloy and Owens examples demonstrate that player
tampering claims are difficult to prove.
The NFL Scouting Combine (Combine) is fertile ground for tampering
involving players, coaches and their representatives. The Combine is the
NFL's annual scouting meeting that is held in Indianapolis every February
prior to the start of the new NFL year and free agency. Nearly every NFL
coach and club executive attends the Combine. The NFLPA also holds a
meeting in conjunction with the Combine, which is attended by five hundred
or more veteran NFLPA-certified player agents. Consequently, the vast
majority of player and coach deal-makers are in one location prior to the start
of player free agency and finalizing of coaching staffs. 114 At the time of the
Combine, potential free agents remain under contract with their current clubs.
Their agents, who may represent other athletes at the Combine, are
nevertheless courted by club executives. 115 Such was the case in February
2001 when the start of free agency was moved back to "allow new head
coaches hired in late January or early February more time to assemble a
staff,"' 116 and the Combine served as the unofficial start of free agency
negotiations.11 7 Commissioner Tagliabue had little to say on the tampering
issue since no teams brought claims, mainly because each was most likely
walking a "fine line." 118
110. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 3.
111. King, supra note 108.
112. Id.
113. Peter King, Monday Morning Quarterback, CNNSI.COM, Jan. 9, 2006,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/writers/peter-king/01/08/mmqb/1 .html.
114. The environment of the Combine is not unlike that of Senior Bowl practice week every
January in Mobile, Alabama, during which most of the NFL deal-makers ostensibly gather to watch
the practices of college football's best senior prospects. Senior Bowl week has become such a
notorious job fair for players, coaches, executives and agents; some clubs have refused to allow their
coaching staffs to attend.
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In 2006, after the start of free agency was again pushed back to
accommodate the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement, there
were a flurry of signings in the early hours of free agency. 119 Former Miami
Dolphins Vice President of Player Personnel Rick Spielman, who previously
stated that a delayed free agency start would push the Combine into "absolute
craziness," 120 "marveled" at the quick signings in light of the Policy. 121
Spielman's sarcasm highlights the folly of the Policy's application during the
Combine. While players, agents, and NFL executives are all cognizant of the
anti-tampering rules, it is obvious that they are willing to quietly disregard
such restrictions in order to get a head start in the free agency process. The
NFL's laissez faire application of the Policy to players contrasts with its
aggressive application to coaches. 122
C. Application to Non-Players
The Policy groups non-players into four categories: (1) head coaches, (2)
assistant coaches, (3) high-level club employees, and (4) other club
employees. 123 Clubs interested in hiring a non-player employee of another
club, whether that employee is under a contract or not, must follow proper
protocol to express their interest. 124 This involves "notify[ing] the owner or
operating head of the employer club" of its interest. 125 While the NFL has
amended some of its policies to facilitate the hiring process of assistant
coaches seeking head coaching positions and is considering doing the same
with mid-to-lower level club employees looking to further ascend in the ranks,
it has retained stringent rules with regard to both head coaches and other high-
119. Rick Spielman, Quick-Strike Strategy Helps Teams Fill Holes, ESPN.COM, Feb. 22, 2006,
http://insider.espn.go.com/nfi/insider/columns/story?columnist=spielman-rick&id=2368178&action=
login&appRedirect=http%3a% 2f/o2fmsider.espn.go.com%2finfl%2 finsider%2 fcolumns%2 fstory%3fc
olumnisto3dspielman rick%26id%3d2368178.
120. Pasquarelli, supra note 94.
121. Spielman, supra note 119.
122. Clubs can give permission to players and their agents to speak with other clubs about the
player, although this practice is rarely applied in the days leading up to the start of free agency.
123. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 4-11.
124. Id. at 10. This does not apply to a person not employed by a NFL club.
125. Id. at 10-11.
This requirement prevails... even if other provisions of this Policy prohibit the employer club
from denying permission to discuss employment with the employee.... Whenever a non-player
employee of a club initiates contact with another club about possible employment, the contacted
club must immediately notify the owner or operating head of the employer club about the contact,
after which all other applicable provisions of this Policy will apply.
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level club employees.
i. Head Coaches
NFL head coaches have limited room to pursue other employment
positions while under contract. 126 During the club's playing season, head
coaches have no opportunity to seek or accept other employment unless they
are terminated. 127 In the off-season, a head coach under contract is still
prohibited from seeking or accepting employment unless: (1) he is dismissed;
(2) "his club has granted him permission to explore other employment
opportunities"; or (3) "his club has granted another club the opportunity to
contact him." 128  The head coach's current club is not obligated to grant
permission to another club. 129 A head coach can avoid these potential
roadblocks by "negotiat[ing] into his contract a right to such off-season
permission."'] 30 Conversely, a club can protect itself by "negotiat[ing] a right
of first-refusal" into the head coach's contract. 13
1
In 2001, Commissioner Tagliabue ruled on an important tampering
claim initiated by the St. Louis Rams. Following the 1999 season after his
club won the Super Bowl, Rams Head Coach Dick Vermeil announced his
retirement. 132 At that time, Coach Vermeil's contract with the Rams extended
through the 2001 season. 133 Although the Rams were under no obligation to
do so, the club replaced Coach Vermeil's coaching contract with a consulting
agreement that paid him $2 million over the following four years. 134 The new
consulting agreement expressly provided that Coach Vermeil was
"terminated" as the Rams' head coach. 135 Approximately a year after the
Rams' Super Bowl victory, Vermeil was rumored to have engaged in
discussions with the Kansas City Chiefs to fill their head coaching vacancy. 136
The Rams learned of these negotiations and filed a tampering claim against the
126. Id. at 5 ("All head coaches in the NFL must be under contract to perform coaching duties at
training camps and during the rest of the playing season.").
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Chiefs. 137 While Commissioner Tagliabue recognized that the agreement did
not prohibit Vermeil from seeking head coaching positions with other clubs in
2000 and 2001, he ruled that "the clear purpose and effect of the [Rams'
consulting] agreement . . . was that Vermeil would remain retired from
coaching through the 2001 season." 138  Thus, Commissioner Tagliabue
awarded the Chiefs' second and third round draft picks to the Rams and
ordered Coach Vermeil to pay back the fees he received from the first year of
his consulting contract. 139 The Chiefs' conduct did not technically violate the
Policy, since Vermeil should have been characterized as a mid-level club
employee ("other club employee"); 140 he was a consultant, not a coach, and
was given less responsibility than a club president or general manager, both of
whom are considered high-level club employees under the Policy.
Notwithstanding, with the spirit and integrity of the Policy at stake,
Commissioner Tagliabue ruled in favor of the Rams. Notably, Commissioner
Tagliabue considered the Rams' intentions in his determination that a violation
took place.
In December 2002, another tampering dispute involving a head coach
stirred the NFL when the Tampa Bay Buccaneers sought compensation after
they claimed to have signed former head coach Bill Parcells to a multi-year
deal. 141 The Buccaneers maintained that Coach Parcells signed a coaching
contract with the club in January 2002. Shortly thereafter, Coach Parcells
decided not to coach the team. 142 Almost a year later, Coach Parcells met with
Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones to discuss the Cowboys' head coaching
vacancy. 143 The Buccaneers' general manager at the time, Rich McKay,
informed the clubs that wanted to meet with Coach Parcells that they needed
to first receive permission from the Buccaneers "in accordance with the NFL
anti-tampering rules."'144 While Commissioner Tagliabue recognized that the
Buccaneers had a "substantial claim," he limited the team's recourse to
seeking damages against only Coach Parcells. 145 Commissioner Tagliabue
137. Id.
138. Rams Say They're Satisfied with Compensation, supra note 93.
139. Id. Vermeil was forced to pay back $500,000.
140. As discussed later in Section III-D, since Vermeil was a consultant he would have been
allowed to discuss employment opportunities with other teams. The Rams could only deny
permission if Vermeil's primary consulting responsibilities revolved around a recurring event during
the time of his interviews, which occurred in late December and early January.




145. Rick Stroud, Cowboys Owe Bucs Nothing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at 4C,
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reasoned that the coaching contract was never filed with the NFL office and
thus was not recognized by the NFL. 14 6 The Buccaneers eventually dropped
their claim entirely. 147
The scope of conduct subject to the Policy was evidenced in 1998.
That year, Cleveland Browns CEO Carmen Policy triggered the Policy's
sanctions after being asked at a luncheon whether the Browns would be
interested in hiring head coach Mike Holmgren. At that time Coach Holmgren
was under contract with the Green Bay Packers.148 Although Policy prefaced
his response by stating that any comment "would be tampering," he then
proceeded to intimate his club's potential interest. 149 Policy quipped, "Let's
just say if a head coach who's out there, who has won a Super Bowl, who has
been to another Super Bowl, who is coaching a team in contention for the
playoffs this year, who is an offensive-minded coach, looking to perhaps move
when the season's over, were to be interested" the Browns would also be
interested.150  The Policy specifically states that "any public or private
statement of interest in another club's employee is a violation."'151 Thus,
despite the luncheon crowd's laughter in response to Policy's rather innocuous
humor, the NFL got the last laugh, issuing a $10,000 fine against the
Cleveland Browns.152
ii. Assistant Coaches and the Birth of the Rooney Rule
While the Policy plainly restricts the ability of head coaches to pursue
employment with other teams during the season, it also recognizes the need for
advancement within the league and thus provides a less stringent policy for
assistant coaches pursuing head coaching positions. Generally, assistant
coaches under contract are not allowed to seek or accept employment with
another club in the league during the season, unless they are terminated. 153
Historically, if assistant coaches were being considered for a head coaching
position, the rules allowed for only limited contact between the employer club









153. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 5.
154. Id. at6.
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involved the hiring club relaying its interest to the employer club, which then
advised the coach of the interest. 155 The coach would then advise the
employer club whether or not he was interested in the position, after which the
employer club would relay the message back to the hiring club. 156 Thus, there
was no direct contact between the assistant coach and the hiring club. 157
The Policy's prescribed limitation on communication subsequently
changed with the implementation of the Rooney Rule. 158 In 2002, the NFL's
Committee on Workplace Diversity (Committee), led by Pittsburgh Steelers'
owner Dan Rooney, recognized the dearth of minority head coaches in the
league. 159 The Committee concurrently observed that the minority coaches
who made it to the head coaching level were extremely successful. 160 The
Committee believed that a key reason for the lack of minority coaches was the
Policy. 161 Many minority assistant coaches worked as offensive and defensive
coordinators of successful teams whose seasons ran deep into the playoffs. 162
Since teams were prohibited from interviewing those coaches until their teams
were eliminated, they hired other candidates. 163 Clubs feared that potentially
waiting until the end of the Super Bowl "might affect the[ir] ability ... to hire
assistant coaches to fill a particular coach's staff, or more importantly,
[possibly] affect [their] capability to prepare adequately for the NFL Draft in
April." 164  The Committee subsequently issued its recommendations to
promote diversity within the coaching ranks, stating "any club seeking to hire
a head coach [must] interview one or more minority applicants for the
position. The one exception [would] occur[] when a club has made a prior
contractual commitment to promote a member of its own staff and no
additional interviewing takes place." 165  These recommendations are
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. The authors are aware of instances where NFL assistant coaches were never advised of
another club's interest in the coach or the inquiring club was falsely led to believe that the assistant
coach was either not interested or contractually unavailable to the inquiring club.
158. For a comprehensive history and well-considered analysis of the Rooney Rule, see Brain
Maravent, Is the Rooney Rule Affirmative Action? Analyzing the NFL's Mandate to Its Clubs
Regarding Coaching and Front Office Hires, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 233, 236-45 (2006).
159. Press Release, Nat'l Football League, supra note 95.
160. Maravent, supra note 158, at 237.




165. Press Release, Natl Football League, supra note 95. The Rooney Rule is supported by the
following guidelines, condensed from their original version:
(1) "prior to beginning the interview process, a club should prepare a job description that clearly
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commonly known as the Rooney-Rule.
Based on the Committee's recommendation, the NFL additionally
amended the Policy to allow a club with a vacant "head coaching position to
request permission to conduct one interview with an assistant coach employed
by a playoff team when that club has a playoff bye or has a wild card playoff
game."' 166 This initial amendment allowed assistant coaches with a bye week
to interview through Friday of the first round of the playoffs and granted
assistant coaches whose teams won their wild card game the opportunity to
interview through Friday of the Divisional Round of the playoffs. 167 This
amendment was further revised to allow assistant coaches to interview through
the playoff weekend, extending the deadline two days. 168 Bear in mind, these
amendments apply only to assistant coaches of playoff teams.
Coach Romeo Crennel, a former defensive coordinator of the New
England Patriots, represents a worthy example of the need for and benefits of
and fully defines the role of its head coach and the qualities it is looking for in its head coach."
(2) "prior to beginning the interview process, clubs should prepare a 'search timeline' that sets forth
key decisions and dates leading up to the hiring of a head coach."
(3) "as part of the search process, clubs should make certain that they identify a deep and diverse --
by many different criteria -- pool of head coaching candidates."
(4) "the Committee strongly believes that direct involvement in the interviewing and selection
process by a club's principal owner is very important.... (Owners are urged] to personally contact
candidates and extend invitations to interview for a club's head coaching position."
(5) "requests for permission to interview must be made and documented in accordance with the
Anti-Tampering Policy."
(6) "invitations to interview - whether accepted or declined - should be documented directly by the
club in a letter to the candidate."
(7) "telephone interviews are never preferable and seldom adequate."
(8) "it is not necessary that the same person interview each applicant."
(9) "candidates who are invited to interview for open positions should do so. Any widespread
refusal... should promptly be brought to the attention of the [NFL] Commissioner or his senior
staff."
(10) In-season head coaching searches are not favored "However, if a coaching change is made
during the season, the club may name an interim coach from its existing coaching staff for the
remainder of the season without going through a formal interviewing process. However, the club
must follow the mandatory interviewing process in choosing a new permanent head coach."
Press Release, Nat'l Football League, NFL Issues Guidelines for Interviewing of Head Coaching
Candidates, (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story/6908387.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 7 (forbidding employer clubs to contract for a
right of first refusal in their favor inconsistent with the Amendment); Press Release, Nat'l Football
League, supra note 165. See Pasquarelli, supra note 94.
168. Jerry DiPaola, Notebook: Rooney Pleased with NFL Trust Extension, PrTr. TRIB. REV., Apr.
1, 2004, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s1 87238.html.
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the Rooney Rule, including the 2002 amendments to the Policy. Prior to their
implementation, Coach Crennel was handcuffed by the Policy because of the
perennial success of the Patriots. 169 Each year his club made the playoffs,
Coach Crennel was prohibited from interviewing for a head coaching position
until the Patriots were eliminated. The Patriots won the Super Bowl for the
2001 season, prohibiting Coach Crennel from interviewing until February
2002. In that year, the Buccaneers, Chargers, Colts, Panthers, Raiders,
Redskins, and Vikings all had coaching vacancies that were filled by other
coaches. 170 Coach Crennel also failed to secure a position after the Patriots
won the Super Bowl again during the 2003 season. 171 Although the NFL had
already amended the Policy at that time, clubs still did not want to wait until
after the Super Bowl to hire their new head coach.172 Not until after the 2004
season did Coach Crennel finally secure a well-deserved head coaching
position.173 Coach Crennel took advantage of the Policy's amendment by
interviewing with the Cleveland Browns during the Patriots' postseason bye
week. This opportunity would not have been afforded to him prior to the
amendment. To be sure, the Browns' patience and willingness to await Coach
Crennel's post-Super Bowl availability also secured his ascension. 174
While an assistant coach still under contract has minimal barriers to
discussing a head coaching position once his team's season is over, he still
faces a significant challenge when considering a lateral move. An assistant
coach seeking a head coaching position must be granted permission to meet
with other clubs from the end of his team's season through February 15 of any
year. 175 While the club is not required to grant permission after the conclusion
of February 15, it has the discretion to do so. 176 Interviewing clubs must make
169. Mark Maske, Teams Eye Patriots' Crennel, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A56123-2005Jan7?language=printer.
170. 2002 NFL Coaching Changes, ESPN.cOM, Mar. 12, 2002, http://espn.go.com/nfl/s/
2002/0312/1350595.html.
171. Id. The Bears, Bills, Cardinals, Falcons, Giants, Redskins, and Raiders all changed coaches
at the end of the 2003 season.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. The 2006 NFL Head Coach of the Year, Lovie Smith, was also a beneficiary of the Rooney
Rule when he was hired in 2004 by the Chicago Bears. David Haugh, Lovie's in the Air, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 15, 2004, at CI; Stan Olson, New Chicago Coach Applauds Hiring Rule, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Feb. 20, 2004, at 3C.
175. Press Release, Nat'l Football League, supra note 165; DiPaola, supra note 168. The original
rule allowed for assistant coaches to interview through March 1 of any year. However, in March
2004, the owners amended the Policy such that "no interviews [would] be granted for any job from
Feb. 15 through the draft." DiPaola, supra note 168.
176. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 6.
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the head coaching candidates aware of the NFL's anti-tampering prohibitions
and furthermore "warn them against making any improper contact with
another club's employees, including any contact during the period prior to a
candidate's official acceptance of a head coaching position."' 177 Conversely,
the employer club is not required to grant an assistant coach the opportunity to
meet with other clubs if he is seeking only a lateral move (i.e., discussing
another assistant coaching position), 178 An assistant coach who continues to
work for his employer club, yet whose contract has expired, 179 must be
granted permission to meet with other clubs once the club's exclusive rights
have terminated, 180 so long as the meeting does not occur between February
15 and the draft.18' Thus, it is advantageous for an assistant coach to structure
his contract such that it expires at the end of the club's season or expressly
provides for an appropriate exception to the Policy.
iii. High-Level Club Employees (Non-Player, Non-Coach)
High-level club employees (club presidents, general managers, and
persons with equivalent responsibilities and authority) 8 2 who are under
contract have little ability to seek positions with other teams. Even where the
employee is being considered for a higher level position by a prospective club,
the employer club is not required to grant permission for the two to meet. 183
As in the case with coaches, clubs can negotiate a right of first refusal with the
employee. 184 A high-level employee who is not under contract or whose
contract has expired, however, has every right to discuss or accept
employment elsewhere.1 85 It is unclear whether a general manager serving as
a team's head coach will be treated as a high-level club employee or head
coach under the Policy. Under either circumstance, however, the Policy is
equally restrictive. Unless permission to speak to other clubs has been
177. Id. at 8.
178. Id. at 6.
179. Id. at 8. "All assistant coaches in the NFL must be under contract in order to perform
coaching duties at training camps and during the rest of the playing season." Id.
180. Id. at 7. If the coach's club is not in the playoffs, the exclusive right extends to "12:01 A.M.
on the Tuesday that falls 15 days after the final Monday-night game of the regular season." If the
coach's club does make the playoffs, the exclusive right ends "on the third Tuesday after the club's
final playoff game, including Super Bowl if applicable, but in no event after the expiration date
specified in the coach's contract." Id.
181. Id. at 6; DiPaola, supra note 168.
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bargained for in the contract, the employer club will dictate whether the
coach/general manager may contact or be contacted by other clubs. 186
Interestingly, in 1996, Green Bay Packers Head Coach Mike Holmgren
was so concerned about another club hiring away his then assistant coach
Andy Reid (currently head coach of the Philadelphia Eagles) that he placed a
"supervisory" tag on Coach Reid, forcing him to be characterized as a high-
level club employee under the Policy. 187 Reid coached the tight ends and
oversaw the offensive line coach. 188  He had no real "supervisory"
responsibilities similar to those of typical high-level club employees. Under
the Policy's guidelines, Reid was at the mercy of Coach Holmgren and the
Packers if he wanted to pursue another job or if another team wanted to pursue
him.189 Coach Holmgren's tag, however, did carry one exception: Reid was
able to interview with another NFL club so long as it was for a head coaching
position, with or without permission. 190 The Packers and Coach Holmgren
clearly used the Policy in their favor, albeit by creating an illusory tag that had
no formidable link to Reid's true responsibilities on the team.
iv. Other Club Employees (Non-Player, Non-Coach)
Club employees who do not fall within the definitions of player, coach,
or high-level employee face the least amount of restrictions on their movement
within the "non-player" category. Generally, an employer may not
unreasonably deny permission'91 for the employee to discuss 192 and accept
employment with another club, even where the employee is under contract for
the succeeding season or seasons. 193 There are, however, two exceptions to
this rule. First and foremost, if the "employee's primary responsibilities
extend to recurring events beyond the playing season," such as those of a
player personnel director whose work is keyed to free agency or the draft,
186. Id. at4, 8
187. Coaches Andy Reid, PHILADELPHIAEAGLES.COM, http://www.philadelphiaeagles.com/
team/coachbio.jspid=638 (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
188. Id.
189. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 4.
190. Coaches -Andy Reid, supra note 187.
191. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 89, at 10 ("[A]n employee must not be unjustifiably
prevented from significantly bettering himself or herself within the League.").
192. Id. at 9. "Permission granted by a club to an employee to discuss employment is also
permission to accept employment with another club, provided, however, that an employer club may
limit the duration of its permission." Id. Permission must be "documented in writing and provided to
the employee in advance of any such discussions." Id.
193. Id.
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permission may be denied until after the event has occurred. 194 This exception
does not apply if the club employee is being considered for a general manager
position with another club. Second, an employer club can deny permission for
a prospective club to contact a club employee if the employee is being
considered for a position that would be a lateral move. 195 Mindful of these
rules, counsel for clubs and club employees must pay attention to titles and
duties language in these employment agreements.
Where a club employee is in his final contract year and the regular
season has finished, the employer club cannot deny permission for the
employee to discuss and accept employment with another team. 196 The lone
exception to this rule applies when the club employee's tasks extend to
recurring events in the off-season, akin to those discussed above. 197 Similar to
coaches under contract for a succeeding season or seasons, the employee is
excluded from this rule if another club is "prepared to offer a general
manager's position, or its equivalent" or the employee's contract has expired
before the recurring off-season event.198
Clubs desiring to hire League employees must first obtain permission
from the "operating head of the League organization."' 199  League
organizations include NFL Enterprises, NFL Films, NFL Management
Council, and NFL Properties. 200 If the individual works for the League office
or is the operating head of a League organization, permission must be acquired
from the Commissioner.20 1
Once issues involving the advancement of assistant coaches were
addressed, the Committee on Workplace Diversity made it clear that it would
shift its focus to "career development and diversity in all front office positions,
both in football and business operations." 20 2 In light of the Committee's
prompt follow through regarding assistant coaches, "other club employees"
can reasonably expect beneficial amendments to the Policy in the near future.
D. Discipline






199. Id. at 10.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Press Release, Nat'l Football League, supra note 95.
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discretionary power to issue sanctions against offending clubs within the
NFL.20 3 The Commissioner can choose from a wide range of sanctions
depending on both the perceived intent of the offending teams and the nature
of and parties to the tampering. Where a club tampers with a player from
another team and fails to prove it was unintentional, the offending club "shall
lose its selection choice in the next succeeding [NFL Draft] in the same round
in which the affected player was originally selected in the [NFL Draft] in
which he was originally chosen." 204  If the player was undrafted, the
Commissioner has the power to choose the round of the selection granted to
the offended team.20 5 Additionally, if the Commissioner concludes that the
offending team acted intentionally, he may issue a fine, half of which can be
awarded to the offended team.206 This fine is limited to $500,000.207 The
Commissioner has similar discretion to remove a club's draft picks if the
tampering involves a college player. Finally, if a club tampers with a coach,
the Commissioner has the power to "award or transfer selection choices and/or
deprive the offending club of a selection choice or choices." 208 While the
Policy is silent on exactly what type of evidence a club must present to support
a successful tampering claim, the Policy's enforcement history establishes a
standard beyond hearsay and circumstantial evidence.
E. The Bottom Line on Tampering
The NFL's continual examination of the ability of both assistant
coaches and "other club employees" to ascend within the NFL portends more
changes to the Policy. While far from ideal, the most recent amendments to
the Policy have been effective in the hiring of a variety of assistant coaches,
most notably coaches Romeo Crennel and Lovie Smith.209 Player tampering,
which appears to be considerably more common and flagrant than non-player
tampering, has been modestly sanctioned. In this context, clubs are hesitant to
make claims, mainly for fear of being labeled a "rat.'' 210 Moreover, the
203. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 92, art. VIII, § 8.13(A).
204. Id. art. IX, § 9.2.
205. Id.
206. Id. "[T]he offended club must first certify to the Commissioner that such an offense has
been committed." Id.
207. Id. art. VIII, § 8.13(A)(1). Upon the violation of the NFL's constitution and bylaws of the
League, which incorporates the NFL's anti-tampering policies, the Commissioner may "suspend
and/or fine such person in an amount not in excess of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000)."
208. Id. art. VIII, § 8.13(A)(3).
209. Haugh, supra note 174; Crennel Agrees to Five Year Deal with Browns, NFL.cOM, Feb. 8,
2005, http://www.nfl.com/teams/CLE/8176133.
210. Pasquarelli, supra note 94.
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relatively high evidentiary burden of any tampering claim, player or non-
player based, is difficult to overcome. Arguably, the Commissioner's office
has at times exceeded its power in order to advance the goals of the Policy;
where a claim lacks substantial evidence of tampering, however, the offended
team lacks recourse.
V. NFL COACHING CONTRACTS
The legal foundation of an NFL coach's employment arrangement is his
contract. Thus, in order to understand the market for NFL coaches it is
important to have a basic understanding of these agreements in the current
NFL environment. The sample size for our analysis of NFL coaching
contracts was twenty-three contracts (included in the sample set were contracts
for head coaches, coordinators, assistant coaches and strength coaches).
Nineteen of the NFL's current thirty-two clubs were represented in the sample.
NFL coaching contracts, unlike NFL player contracts, are not standardized and
range in length from twenty-plus page head coaching contracts to cryptic, one-
page letters of appointment. Notwithstanding their lack of uniformity, the
majority of NFL coaching contracts contain a core set of fundamental
provisions with similar, and in a few instances, exact language. The following
analysis provides a review of important contract provisions derived from the
sample set with some specific examples of unique or extraordinary provisions.
A. Confidentiality Provisions
Surprisingly, only two of the NFL coaching contracts reviewed contained
an express prohibition against the disclosure of the contracts' terms.2 11 On the
other hand, many contracts included confidentiality or work product
provisions relating to tangible and proprietary documentation of the club.
Under the terms of such provisions, work product, including scouting reports,
films, photographs, computerized programs, strategies and plays, remains
property of the team upon termination of the coach. 212 The St. Louis Rams'
and Seattle Seahawks' contracts further provide that the coach agrees to an
injunction to restrain the coach from disclosing such confidential
information. 213
211. ATLANTA FALCONS FOOTBALL CLUB, INC., EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 18 (Feb. 2, 2004)
(on file with author); KANSAS CITY CHIEFS FOOTBALL CLUB, INC., EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT:
ASSISTANT COACH 14 (Jan. 23, 2004) (on file with author).
212. See, e.g., CLEVELAND BROWNS FOOTBALL CO., LLC, ASSISTANT COACH EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT 13 (Feb. 7, 2003) (on file with author); DETROIT LIONS, INC., HEAD COACH
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT l(f) (Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
213. ST. Louis RAMS P'SHIP, AGREEMENT 13 (Dec. 8, 2003) (on file with author). The Seattle
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Arguably, the language of most clubs' confidentiality or work product
provisions extends to the dissemination of the coach's employment terms.
Although a court may be challenged to accept such an argument as the detail
required to protect against disclosure of other forms of confidential
information is particularly specific, mandatory arbitration clauses found in
NFL coaching contracts serve to shield their terms from judicial
consideration.214 The fact that a very small percentage of clubs expressly
prohibit disclosure of contract terms bodes well for the prospects of NFL clubs
and the NFLCA sharing contract information in a legally permissible
manner.
215
B. Constitution, Bylaws, Rules and Regulations
The Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL216 (NFL Constitution) require
that all coaches receive a written employment contract subject to the approval
of the Commissioner. 217 Consequently, the Commissioner is a signatory to
every NFL coaching contract (as well as to the contracts of NFL
administrators and supervisors).
All NFL coaching contracts require a clause wherein the coach agrees
to be bound by "the [NFL] Constitution and Bylaws and the Rules and
Regulations of the League, as well as by the decisions of the Commissioner,
which decisions shall be final, conclusive and unappealable." 218  This
obligation results in every NFL coaching contract containing what amounts to
an arbitration format for any dispute, claim or controversy arising from the
coach's employment with the club. The NFL Constitution further requires that
the coach waive any claim he may possess against the Commissioner,
individually and in his official capacity, the NFL and each of its member
clubs, as well as any interest holder in the clubs "for damages and for any
other claims or demands arising out of or connected with any decisions of the
Commissioner." 219 The NFL Constitution further requires that every coach's
contract contain an integration clause so that no employment terms or
agreements are contained outside of the four corners of the coaching
Seahawks' contract further provides that the club may recover from the coach $10,000 as liquidated
damage for each and every breach of this nondisclosure provision. FOOTBALL NW. LLC,
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT FOR DEFENSIVE COORDINATOR 8 (Jan. 12 2000) (on file with author).
214. See FOOTBALL NW. LLC, supra note 213, 16.
215. See infra Part VII.
216. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 92.
217. Id. art. IX, § 9.3(A)(1).
218. Id. art. IX, § 9.3(A)(2).
219. Id.
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contract. 220
As employees of an NFL club, the NFL Constitution prohibits coaches
from the following activities and/or conduct:
1. owning a financial interest, directly or indirectly, in another club;
2. loaning money, directly or indirectly, to any player, coach or
employee of another club or to another club;
3. loaning money, directly or indirectly, or offering a gift to a game
official or NFL employee;
4. acting as agent for an NFL player;
5. publicizing or participating in the selection of any mythical all-
League or all-opponent team;
6. offering any gift or reward to a player, coach or individual
employed by or affiliated with another club for defeating or
attempting to defeat a competing club (offers of gifts to a coach's own
players can result in a salary cap charge or violation) 21;
7. publicly criticizing any member club or its employees and/or any
official;
8. directly or indirectly paying a fine for a person who has been
penalized;
9. voluntarily failing to present his team for a pre-season or regular
season game;
10. tampering with college football players ineligible to play in the
NFL;
11. tampering with a player, coach or employee under contract to
another member club;
12. offering, agreeing, conspiring or attempting to illegally influence
the outcome of a game or failing to immediately discipline any officer,
player or employee of the coach's club that attempted to influence the
outcome of a game;
220. Id.
221. In 2003, Kansas City Chiefs Coach Dick Vermeil reportedly offered then Chiefs Kicker
Morten Andersen a $500 bottle of win if Andersen was successful in kicking a thirty-five yard field
goal against the Raiders. Anderson made the kick to lift the Chiefs over the Raiders 27-24. Upon
learning of the offer, the League office contacted the Chiefs to advise that such offers were prohibited
notwithstanding the League did not assess a fine or other disciplinary action against the Chiefs.
Associated Press, NFL to Vermneil: No Wine for Kicker, RENO GAZETTE J., Nov. 23, 2003, available
at http://www.rgi.com/news/stories/html/2003/11/25/57732.php.
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13. taking an interest in any pool or wager of any NFL game; and
14. using at any time impermissible communications or information
gathering equipment (i.e., stealing an opponent club's proprietary
information via telephone tapping). 222
C. Term and Termination Provisions
With one exception, all contracts reviewed from the sample set were
for a duration of three years or less. Although in a few instances-most notably
contracts of head coaches-the contracts reviewed and others reported
contained future option years beyond year three of the contract, triggered upon
the achievement of performance thresholds (e.g., a divisional playoff win or
conference championship win in the prior seasons). Not surprisingly, NFL
coaching contracts provide for termination under two circumstances: (1)
termination at any time for any reason (i.e., without cause) and (2) for cause
termination. In at least one contract, there was no distinction between
termination for cause or without cause, and although the contract required the
coach's mitigation upon termination, the contract contained no express
provision denying base salary or benefits through the end of its term.223
Generally, upon termination without cause, the club is obligated to pay
the coach equal installments of his base salary through the term of the
contract. In each instance, however, the club is entitled to offset this
obligation against any and all income, fees, salary, royalties, etc. - with the
exception of investment income - against the amount due the coach.224
Moreover, most coaching contracts also require that the coach meet regular
income reporting requirements. In the case of the Arizona Cardinals, for
example, coaches are required to provide the club with copies of their federal
income tax returns although they are entitled to omit "Schedule A - Itemized
Deductions (Form 1040)."225 Some NFL coaching contracts address the
situation where the coach voluntarily terminates employment with the club. In
each of these circumstances, the coach is required to obtain the club's prior
written consent before accepting any position affiliated with another team
competing in the NFL.
Approximately half of the contracts reviewed address termination in the
222. Id. art. IX, §§ 9.1(B)-(C).
223. N.Y. FOOTBALL GIANTS, CONTRACT (Mar. 1, 2005) (on file with author).
224. See, e.g., BUFFALO BILLS, INC., ASSISTANT COACH AGREEMENT 7(e) (Feb. 26, 2004) (on
file with author).
225. B&B HOLDINGS, INC., EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 7(f) (Jan. 28, 2004) (on file with
author).
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context of death or disability. In the case of death, most contracts that address
this circumstance provide that the club should pay the coach's designated
beneficiary (or the coach's estate if no beneficiary has been designated) the
accrued salary owed to the coach through the last day of the month in which
the death occurs as well as any vested and accrued benefits from pension and
profit sharing plans maintained by the club. In those contracts that address
termination for disability, typically the disability must be for a duration of no
less than sixty days-most provide for ninety days-and such disability must
be determined by the club physician. Although some contracts provide that
the club physician's determination of disability will be conducted in a non-
discriminatory manner, no contract reviewed provided the coach with a second
opinion regarding the determination of disability.
The circumstances giving rise to for cause termination run the gamut.
For example, the San Francisco Forty Niners' contract requires that the coach
maintain himself in excellent physical condition or he shall be subject to
termination. 226 On the other end of the spectrum, nearly every contract
permits for cause termination upon the conviction of a felony. Interestingly,
the Seattle Seahawks' contract provided for cause termination yet did not
define "cause." 227 Some of the other more common circumstances giving rise
to cause in NFL contracts are:
1. Coach's failure or refusal to comply with club policies or standards,
or the NFL or its Commissioners' regulations;
2. Fraud, dishonesty or "acts of moral turpitude";
3. Coach's material breach of any covenant, promise, or obligation of
the contract;
4. Illegal gambling or betting on professional football (whether legally
or illegally);
5. Habitual intoxication;
6. Accepting a bribe or agreeing to throw or fix a game; and
7. Scalping of tickets. 228
Some of the more amorphous or unique circumstances giving rise to for
226. SAN FRANCISCO FORTY NINERS, LTD., CONTRACT FOR ASSISTANT COACH § IV (Feb. 1,
2004) (on file with author).
227. See FOOTBALL NW. LLC, supra note 213.
228. See generally CLEVELAND BROWNS FOOTBALL Co., LLC, supra note 212, 8(b)(i); B&B
HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 225, 7(c)(ii); MIAMI DOLPHINS, LTD., EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
2.4.2 (Jan. 19, 2004) (on file with author); INDIANAPOLIS COLTS, ASSISTANT COACH EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT 13 (Mar. 18, 2003) (on file with author).
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cause termination include the following:
1. Frequenting places or associating with individuals of questionable
character;
2. Any act or thing which tends to bring the coach into public hatred,
contempt, scorn or ridicule;
3. Conduct detrimental to the best interest of the club, professional
football or the NFL;
4. Insubordination on the part of the coach;
5. Loyalty Clauses;229 and
6. Violations of any rules and regulations of the PAC-10 Conference
and/or the NCAA. 230
D. Duties/Conduct
The expressed duties or obligations of a NFL assistant coach are
frequently defined in basic terms. For example, the "[e]mployee will perform
the duties of an [a]ssistant [c]oach as generally understood in professional
football. ' 231 Almost all assistant coaching contracts reviewed further required
that in addition to those duties generally understood in professional football,
the assistant coach would also undertake any duties designated by the head
coach.232 Many contracts examined contain specific language regarding the
services that the coach will provide. These services include training, scouting,
counseling, conditioning and evaluating potential talent (draft prospect
scouting), as well as coaching a given position.233 The Oakland Raiders
require their assistant coaches to assist not only in the evaluation of football
229. The Houston Texans identified the following conduct as constituting cause for termination:
if "[t]he [c]oach makes or publishes any criticism, condemnation, denunciation, or repudiation of the
[c]lub or the management, operations or decisions thereof to any persons not employed by the [c]lub
that, in the sole discretion of the club, materially impairs the goodwill, business or property of the
[c]lub." HOUSTON NFL HOLDINGS, LP, AMENDED AND RESTATED EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT § 6
(c)(4) (Feb. 1, 2002) (on file with author). Several clubs maintain similar "loyalty" provisions in their
coaching contracts.
230. See generally GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., CONTRACT: ASSISTANT COACH, art. 111(d) (Feb.
1, 2005) (on file with author); B&B HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 225, 5; MIAMI DOLPHINS, LTD.,
supra note 228, 2.4.2.
231. MIAMI DOLPHINS, LTD., supra note 228, 1. See also MINN. VIKINGS FOOTBALL CLUB,
LLC, EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 1 (Feb. 1, 2004).
232. See, e.g., N.Y. JETS L.L.C., EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (Jan. 27, 2004).
233. See, e.g., OAKLAND RAIDERS, LP, AGREEMENT (Mar. 6, 2003); SAN FRANCISCO FORTY
NNERS LTD., supra note 226, II.
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talent but also in soliciting and signing professional football players.234
A small percentage of the contracts reviewed expressly identified
collateral services required of the assistant coach. For example, the coach
"shall additionally make himself available for, and reasonably participate in,
all pre-game or post-game (including next day) interviews and/or question and
answer media sessions as may be reasonably required by, or customary in or
with, the NFL. '235 Interestingly, the St. Louis Rams require their assistant
coaches to perform public relations work, including "attending banquets,
luncheons and other affairs of civic nature" without payment of any additional
compensation. 236
Identifying the particulars of a coach's duties provides some comfort in
terms of understanding job responsibilities. However, such definition also
carries the risk of exposing the coach to a broader range of activities that give
rise to for cause termination, as most coaching contracts expressly provide that
failure to satisfy contractual duties constitutes grounds for termination. From
the coach's perspective, then, it may be more beneficial to define duties
generically.
Recent NFL Europe contracts include a substance abuse provision that:
(1) obligates the coach to submit to voluntary drug, alcohol and/or steroid
testing; (2) requires the coach to abide by the NFL Europe League's Substance
Abuse Policies and Procedures which provides penalties for a confirmed
positive test; and (3) acknowledges the coach's agreement that a refusal and/or
failure to submit to any drug test in timely fashion is grounds for termination
with cause.237
E. Base Salary
In 2005, the average assistant coach's base salary was $268,000 across the
NFL.2 38 As of this writing, the estimated 2006 average salary for all NFL
assistant coaches is approximately $290,000.239 The chart below shows the
234. See OAKLAND RAIDERS, supra note 233.
235. CLEVELAND BROWNS FOOTBALL Co., LLC, supra note 212, 4(c)(iii). See also ST. LOUIS
RAMS P'SHIP, supra note 213, 7(D).
236. ST. LOUIS RAMS P'SHIP, supra note 213, 7(D)(i).
237. NFL EUR. FLA., INC., INTERN FOOTBALL COACH CONTRACT 9 (Jan. 17, 2003) (on file
with author).
238. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COACHES ASS'N, supra note 38.
239. Telephone Interview with Larry Kennan, Executive Dir., NFLA, in Washington, D.C. (July
25, 2006). Mr. Kennan's estmate considers two factors: (1) salaries currently reported (as provided
in the chart as of December 1, 2006); and (2) salaries that will be reported following the completion
of the 2006 NFL season. Logically, the greater the number of salaries actually reported, the more
accurate will be the estimated average salary of all NFL assistant coaches (reported and not reported).
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dramatic rise in NFL coaching salaries during the last five years (2006
numbers will not be finalized until early in 2007). However, these numbers in
the last two years may not accurately reflect the actual increase in average
salaries because many coaches failed to participate (the trend of decreased
salary reporting from year to year is yet another factor weighing in favor of
permissible information sharing discussed in Section VII). In any event, at a
minimum, they show a trend of increasing salaries.
All Assistant
Year Offensive Avg. Defensive Avg. Coaches and Avg.
Coordinators24o Salary Coordinators Salary Coordinators Salary
2001 27 $309,000 30 $370,000 493 $184,000
2002 23 $330,000 28 $417,000 427 $198,000
2003 22 $400,000 27 $442,000 393 $209,000
2004 21 $460,000 19 $587,000 334 $235,000
2005 18 $585,000 12 $833,000 224 $280,000
2006241 9 $680,500 7 $643,000 203 $277,000
The NFLCA does not conduct annual surveys of head coaches' salaries.
Nevertheless, the salaries of NFL head coaches are widely reported. In 2002,
recently hired Washington Redskins head coach Steve Spurrier's $5 million
per year annual salary inched the average annual salary for NFL head coaches
to just shy of $3 million.242 Although 2006 will bring many first year NFL
head coaches to the sidelines,243 lucrative contract extensions for veteran NFL
head coaches - Mike Holmgren ($7 million per year average), 244 and John Fox
($5 million per year average)245 - have likely spiraled the average NFL head
Id.
240. Larry Kennan also says that coordinator salaries tend to be higher for defense than offense
because several head coaches run their offenses. Id.
241. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COACHES AsS'N, PRELIMINARY SALARY SURVEY (2006) (salary
information reported to the NFLCA as of December 1, 2006).
242. Len Pasquarelli, Coaches Have Become NFL's Superstars, ESPN.COM, Aug. 27, 2002,
http://espn.go.cornnfl/preview02/columns/pasquarelli-len/1423330.html.
243. In 2006, the following coaches are first year NFL head coaches: Packers head coach Mike
McCarthy, Lions head coach Rod Marinelli, Saints head coach Sean Payton, Jets head coach Eric
Mangini, Vikings head coach Brad Childress, and Texans head coach Gary Kubiak.
244. James Joyner, Seahawks Sign Holmgren to Two-Year Extension, OTB SPORTS, May 17,
2006, http://sports.outsidethebeltway.com/2006/05/seahawks-sign-hotmgren-to-two-year-extension/.
In 1999, Coach Holmgren signed a then record-breaking eight-year, $35 million deal as the coach-
general manager of the Seahawks.
245. Matthew Borghese, Carolina Panthers Give Coach Fox 5-Year Contract, ALL HEADLINE
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coach salary beyond $3 million per year.
There is no longer an off-season for NFL coaches. Accordingly, their
salaries are paid throughout the year, typically in semi-monthly installments.
F. Bonuses
Unlike their head coaching brethren, assistant coaches enjoy
surprisingly few bonuses. In those circumstances where bonuses are provided,
the assistant coach typically receives an amount equivalent to a player's share
of post-season bonuses.24 6 In 2006, on a per-game basis, post-season bonuses
ranged from $17,000 (for a non-division winner participating in a Wild Card
game) to $73,000 for players on the winning Super Bowl team.247 For those
assistant coaches with playoff bonuses, a total of $148,000 was available in
the aggregate, assuming the coach's club won the Super Bowl. 248 Some clubs,
such as the Atlanta Falcons, add $5000 to the player's share amount
throughout the post-season.2 49 Many clubs leave the amount of the playoff
bonus to the discretion of the club and do not tie such sum to the NFL player's
share.
Bonuses for head coaches are most frequently tied to performance.
Financial incentives include incremental and cumulative payments based on:
(i) earning a playoff bid; (ii) earning home field advantage through the
playoffs; (iii) winning the Conference Championship Game; (iv) participating
in the Super Bowl; and (v) winning the Super Bowl.250 Head coaches may
also receive monetary bonuses for being named Coach of the Year by the
Sporting News, Associated Press, United Press International or Pro Football
NEWS, Mar. 27, 2006, http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7002944970.
246. See, e.g., MIAMI DOLPHINS, LTD., supra note 228, 4.8. Per the Minnesota Vikings'
contract, "[l1n the event of any post-season play by the Club, post-season pay will be equivalent to a
player's share as defined in Article XLII, Section 2 of the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement."
MINN. VIKINGS FOOTBALL CLUB, LLC, supra note 231. The New York Giants' assistant coaching
contracts contain similar language:
[I]f in any football season covered by this Contract, the Club shall play in any post-season game or
games which shall entitle the Club's players to receive a payment or payments by virtue of the
Club's participation in such game or games, then the Assistant Coach shall also be entitled to
receive a payment or payments determined by the same mechanism and paid under the same terms
as the payments received by the Club's players under the most recently executed collective
bargaining agreement between the National Football League Player's Association and the National
Football League Management Council.
N.Y. FOOTBALL GIANTS, supra note 223.
247. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 7, art. XLII, § 2.
248. Id.
249. ATLANTA FALCONS FOOTBALL CLUB, LLC, supra note 211, 3(b).
250. See, e.g., DETROIT LIONS, INC., supra note 212, 3(e).
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Weekly. 251
G. Coaches' Healthcare and Benefits
Today's NFL coaches operate in an intensely stressful environment. Not
surprisingly, this intense level of stress can, and frequently does, cause or
exacerbate health problems. NFLCA Director Larry Kennan estimates that
today's NFL coaches work ninety to one hundred hours a week, seven days a
week, for twenty-six straight weeks.252 "You can't do that for 15 straight
years and not let it affect your health. ' 253 Last year, the reported instances of
coaches' health problems included St. Louis Rams Head Coach Mike Martz
(fifty-four at the time), who took an indefinite leave of absence believed to be
caused by endocarditis, Green Bay Packer Offensive Coordinator Tom
Rossley (fifty-nine at the time), who was hospitalized just before a game
between the Packers and the Tampa Bay Buccaneers after experiencing pains
in his chest, left arm and side (Rossley had bypass surgery in 2004),254
Jacksonville Jaguars Offensive Line Coach Paul Boudreau (fifty-five at the
time), who collapsed in the locker room after his club's season-opening
victory against the Seattle Seahawks, and Seahawks Defensive Coordinator
Ray Rhodes (fifty-four at the time), who suffered a mild stroke.255
Currently, only half of the NFL teams provide health insurance to coaches
at no cost. Therefore, nearly half of the NFL's coaches pay for their own
medical health insurance. The NFL maintains a Flex Benefit Plan for this
purpose. For those coaches not fortunate enough to receive paid healthcare
coverage, they can expect insurance premiums to reflect their health history in
an increasingly stressful environment. 25 6
Few coaching contracts expressly provide for °health and disability
insurance. And, of the contracts reviewed, even fewer incorporate by
reference an employee handbook or policy manual that may contain the terms
of such benefits. The Houston Texans, however, offer an array of fringe
benefits to assistant coaches that include the coach's right to participate in the
251. Id.
252. Jarrett Bell, Coaches Often Lack Game Plan for Own Health, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2005,
at 3C.
253. Id.
254. Id. Rossley signed himself out of the hospital that day to return to the game in the second
quarter after hospital tests indicated that he was not suffering a heart attack.
255. Id. Rhodes returned to the Seahawks after a brief medical leave of two weeks. See
Telephone Interview with Larry Kennan, supra note 239.
256. Telephone Interview with Ins. Agent John Beam, Vice President, Willis Sports & Entm't, in
Charlotte, N.C. (July 25, 2006).
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NFL's pension plan or any club-sponsored 401(k) savings plan, the coach's
and his family's entitlement to health and welfare benefit plans maintained by
the club, life insurance and disability insurance as maintained by the club,
tickets to each of the club's football games (as determined in accordance with
the club's ticket policy), the use of an automobile at no cost to the coach (other
than non-reimbursable gas and maintenance expenses) and paid vacation in
accordance with the club's policy.25 7  Express provisions granting the
reimbursement of reasonable business and travel expenses were scarce among
the contracts reviewed. 258




Few assistant coaching contracts expressly provide the coach with the use
of an automobile. 259 This is a departure from most major college programs,
which provide their staffs with a dealer courtesy car through long established
dealer programs. This may be a result of history. In the past, college coaches
were expected to travel the country scouting players, while NFL coaches had
players coming to them. Surprisingly, few assistant coaching contracts
reviewed expressly provide for game tickets-home or away-let alone Super
Bowl tickets.260
ii. Head Coaches
The perquisites available to an NFL head coach may be limited only by
his modesty and tax accountant. Typical examples include Super Bowl
tickets, automobile allowances, V.I.P. parking passes and relocation
257. HOUSTON NFL HOLDINGS, LP, supra note 229, 5.
258. But, cf BUFFALO BELLS, INC., supra note 224; CLEVELAND BROWNS FOOTBALL CO., LLC,
supra note 208.
259. The Green Bay Packers provides its assistant coaches with "the use of one late model, high
quality automobile of the Packers' choice" or the cost and expenses in connection with the coach's
lease of such vehicle, as well as insurance. GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., supra note 230, art. I(d).
Notably, an express automobile provision is absent in the Packers' Director of Player
Development/Offensive Assistant contract. GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., DIR. OF PLAYER
DEVELOPMENT/OFFENSIVE ASSISTANT (Feb. 14, 2005) (on file with author).
260. The Cleveland Browns' assistant coaches, however, enjoy the right to four complimentary
home game tickets and the opportunity to purchase four away game tickets as well as two Super Bowl
tickets. CLEVELAND BROWNS FOOTBALL CO., LLC, supra note 212, 5(d).
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expenses. 261 More exotic examples include sky boxes, catered and furnished
in the coach's discretion, first class family travel, and privileges at elite
country clubs.262
I. Right of Publicity Provisions263
Nearly every NFL coaching contract reviewed contained a provision
that, at a minimum, assigns a nonexclusive right to the club for the duration of
the coach's employment (and sometimes thereafter 264) to use the coach's
name, portrait, picture, likeness, voice, etc. captured in games, practices or
interviews in conjunction with any promotional, advertising, marketing or
trade purpose that the club desires. With the exception of a head coach's
participation in television and radio shows, NFL coaches must receive the
prior written consent of the club before participating in any activities that
generate collateral income. 265 Moreover, in the contracts that contained right
of publicity provisions, nearly every such contract expressly provides that the
coach "shall not use the club's logos, trademarks, name or any other protected
right without the express written consent of the club or when required, the
National Football League." 266  Although an NFL head coach maintains
enough leverage to routinely secure consent from his club to identify himself
as the club's head coach, 267 rarely will even a head coach be permitted to use
261. See DETROIT LIONS, INC., supra note 212, 3(d), (f).
262. Id. 7.
263. The right of publicity is the right of every human being to control the unauthorized use of
his or her name, likeness or other index of personal identity for purposes of trade. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1350 (8th ed. 2004).
264. The Indianapolis Colts retain the nonexclusive right to the coach's right of publicity in
perpetuity. INDIANAPOLIS COLTS, supra note 228, 9(b).
265. A typical right of publicity provision contains language such as the following: "[W]ithout
the Club's prior written consent, [the coach is prohibited from] licens[ing] to any third party the right
to use his name, likeness, photograph, voice, signature facsimile or biographical information, for any
commercial or promotional purposes whatsoever." HOUSTON NFL HOLDINGS, LP, supra note 224, §
4(c).
266. See, e.g., GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., supra note 230, art. V. The Atlanta Falcons further
require that the coach not participate in any commercial or promotional ventures that are based on or
designed to profit from the coach's relationship with the Atlanta Falcons or the Falcons' membership
in the NFL without the Falcons' prior written approval. ATLANTA FALCONS FOOTBALL CLUB, LLC.,
supra note 211, 6(b).
267. For instance, Bill Cowher, the coach of the 2006 Super Bowl Champion Pittsburgh Steelers,
is participating in three national television advertising campaigns leading into the 2006-07 season and
is pictured on the cover of EA Sports' NFL Head Coach video game. Terry Lefton, Season After
Super Bowl Victory, Cowher Showing Higher Profile in Advertisements, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS
BUS. J., July 17, 2006, at 5. Notably, all advertisements Cowher is participating in are for current
sponsors of the NFL. Id.
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the NFL's trademarks in conjunction with endorsements, appearances or
advertisements.2 68 Such consent would need to come from NFL Properties,
Inc.269; it is not within the club's power to grant such license. This is also true
for players and team owners.
J. NFL Properties, Inc. Provision
In recent years, the NFL has secured lucrative licenses from corporate
America for on-field apparel and in-stadium advertising.270 In recognition of
such agreements and in an effort to protect its sponsors, the NFL requires that
every coaching contract contain the following language, typically identified in
a contract paragraph entitled "Game Day Promotions," "Sideline Apparel" or
some similar heading:
Game Day Commercial Licensing Programs.
Employee acknowledges that Employer, through NFL Properties, Inc.,
is participating in one or more game day commercial licensing
programs. Therefore, Employee agrees that he will not accept any
consideration from third parties for and will not wear, display or
promote any apparel or other product bearing commercial names or
logos of manufacturers throughout the game day period while
Employee is in view of the stadium and television audience, including
any pre-game warm-ups, in the bench area, and during post-game
268. For example, even the Dallas Cowboys' storied head coach Bill Parcells's television
advertisements for his instructional videos (Backyard Drills) that routinely air on the NFL network
are bereft of any reference to the National Football League or its trademarks. Coach Parcells does,
however, identify himself as the "head coach of the Dallas Cowboys" in such advertisements. Bill
Parcells'Backyard Drills Commercial (2005).
269. NFL Properties, Inc. is the NFL's exclusive representative for licensing and protection of the
NFL trademarks, including the name, logos, symbols and other identifyring marks, and that of its
member clubs. NFL Properties, Inc. v. BBC Ab., No. D2000-0147 (2000) (Page, Arb.), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-O147.html.
270. Over the past decade, NFL Properties has pared down its licensed merchandisers to better
manage its fan base and products. NFL Brand Game Plan: Team Effort-National Football League
Reorganizes its Apparel Licensing Program, DSN RETAILING TODAY, Sept. 17, 2001, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m0FNP/is 16 40/ai78544571. The NFL has signed long-
term deals with companies such as Reebok, VF Imagewear and G-III for merchandising of sideline
apparel and footwear for all thirty-two NFL teams. Id. Under the terms of the license agreements, a
licensee of the NFL trademarks must pay nine to eleven percent royalties to NFL Properties and
guarantee a minimum payment to NFL Properties, even if the product is unsuccessful. Michael
Barrier, Getting a Product into the End Zone - How to Get Products Licensed by the National
Football League or the National Collegiate Athletic Association, NATION'S BuS., Feb. 1997,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ml154/is-n2_v85/ai_19084114. Further, it
must receive approval of product samples prior to production and create the product in thirty-two
versions to represent all NFL teams. Id.
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interviews in the locker room or on the field. However, Employee
understands that pursuant to such NFL Properties licensing programs,
Employee is expected to wear merchandise on game day on the
sidelines as provided by official NFL suppliers and as directed by
NFL Properties, and Employee agrees to do so. 2
71
K. Control Provisions
As coach Bill Parcells said, "If they want you to cook the dinner, at least
they ought to let you shop for some of the groceries." 27
2
Understandably, control provisions are a key component in head coaching
contracts. Many head coaches not only prefer, but require, the sole and
exclusive right to select, hire and terminate assistant coaches, coordinators and
strength coaches. Many head coaches also require final decision making
authority on trades, draft selections, roster cuts and the final roster
composition. 273  The Detroit Lions' head coaching contract requires the
approval of club president Matt Millen on all such player decisions.
274
Assistant coaching contracts rarely provide for a coach's right to control
club operations. In fact, the Oakland Raiders' contract prohibits an assistant
coach from hiring and firing personnel (presumably this prohibition applies to
uniformed and non-uniformed personnel). 275
L. Unique Provisions
i. Assignments
In what amounts to a trade clause, the Cleveland Browns have included an
assignment provision in its contract permitting the club to assign its rights or
obligations, without restriction, to any entity in which the club has an equity
interest.276 Such provision may be particularly useful to the clubs that also
own an Arena Football League team.277 From the coach's perspective, such
271. BUFFALO BILLS, INC., supra note 224, 18.
272. Ron Borges & Nick Cafardo, Parcells out; Carroll in?, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1997, at El
(comments made by Coach Bill Parcells during a press conference to announce his resignation as
head coach of the New England Patriots).
273. DETROIT LIONS, INC., supra note 212, l(a)(ii).
274. Id. l(a)(v).
275. See OAKLAND RAIDERS, LP, supra note 233.
276. CLEVELAND BROWNS FOOTBALL CO., LLC, supra note 212, 7.
277. The Dallas Cowboys, Atlanta Falcons and Denver Broncos are owners of Arena Football
League clubs.
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an assignment is akin to a reassignment clause frequently seen in college
coaching contracts. 278  In essence, it provides the parent club with the
opportunity to continue to receive value for a coach when a termination for
cause is not available. And, in practice, these assignment clauses may serve to
dramatically reduce the value of the remaining guaranteed portion of the
existing contract if a coach reasonably believes that such an assignment (e.g.,
to an Arena Football League club) represents a career-limiting proposition. In
that circumstance, the coach may negotiate for less than the outstanding
balance of his contract in an effort to purchase his contractual freedom. One
Arizona Cardinals' contract included an assignment provision that was limited
to the "successor entity" of the club.279 From both the club and coach's
perspective, such an assignment is reasonable.
ii. Agreement Not to Solicit
Some assistant coaching contracts require the assistant coach to agree not
to solicit, negotiate or hire any current employee of the club without the
permission of the head coach or the President/General Manager in the event
the assistant coach later becomes an NFL head coach.280 The value of this
provision to the club may currently be less significant because of the Policy.
However, if the NFL continues to relax the Policy, the value of such a
provision to the club increases.
iii. Work Stoppage
A few of the contracts reviewed provided a force majeure clause
drafted broadly enough to arguably permit tolling or termination of the
employment contract in the event that a strike or labor dispute results in a
work stoppage. Only the New York Jets' coaching contract, however,
expressly identified all forms of work stoppage as grounds for suspending and
eventually terminating the employment arrangement. 281
iv. Lame Duck Clauses/Exceptions to the Anti-Tampering Rules
No assistant coaching contract reviewed addressed the situation where
the head coach was terminated prior to the end the season. Most assistant
278. See Robert Lattinville, Put Me in Coach: A Game Plan for Negotiating and Drafting
College Coaching Contracts, ST. LOUIS LAW., Nov. 1, 2000, at 12A for a discussion of reassignment
clauses in college coaching contracts.
279. See B&B HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 225, T 16.
280. See, e.g., KANSAS CITY CHIEFS FOOTBALL CLUB, INC., supra note 210, 13.
281. N.Y. JETS, LLC, supra note 232.
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coaches in this circumstance recognize that their best prospects for coaching in
the NFL the following season likely lie elsewhere. Coaches in this situation
desire the freedom to explore other opportunities. In contrast, most clubs in
this situation desire to retain the staff at least as long as it takes to hire a new
head coach. Clubs frequently desire their assistants' continued employment so
that the new head coach may consider retaining certain assistants for any
number of reasons, including the staff's institutional and player knowledge. 282
In order to avoid the potentially detrimental consequences of a
"supervisory tag," or to increase future employment opportunities, or both,
coaches and clubs should also consider the benefit of express exceptions to the
NFL's Anti-Tampering rules. These carve-outs can range from a club's right
of first refusal to an agreement that a supervisory tag may only be applied in
the event a certain threshold level of salary is provided.
v. Buy Outs
No NFL coaching contract reviewed contained a buy out clause. Such
provisions have become rather common within the realm of college coaching.
The likely reason for the lack of buy out clauses is that NFL coaching
contracts are essentially guaranteed, absent, of course, grounds for a
termination with cause. Yet, the somewhat onerous mitigation provisions
contained in NFL coaching contracts and the relative frequency of disputes
arising therefrom 283 suggest that a well-considered buy out clause could make
sense. At a minimum, buyouts give both parties financial certainty in the
event of termination and remove the potential for animosity that frequently
accompanies arbitration.
M The Future of Liquidated Damages Provisions and Offsets for Post-
Termination Income
The 2006 discharge of Mike Heimerdinger as offensive coordinator by the
New York Jets-after a protracted and public standoff over whether he was to
be retained, possibly against his own desires-after unsuccessfully
interviewing to become the team's head coach, is illustrative of the potential
conflicts that can arise as coaches change places before the expiration of their
contracts. 284 As coaching salaries continue to escalate, clubs may take an
282. Interview with Dennis Cordell, General Counsel, NFLCA (2005).
283. Interview with Larry Kennan, Executive Director, NFLCA (Aug. 7, 2006).
284. See Karen Crouse, Assistant for Jets Wants Out of Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at
D5. Crouse details the Jets retaining Heimerdinger, the coach they gave a significant raise to in
recruiting him to New York only a year earlier. Bob LaMonte is quoted as saying he was
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increasingly active role in seeking to enforce offset provisions for additional
income earned after a coach is terminated but before his contract expires or
they may seek to have discharged coaches ask to have their contracts
rescinded. Cases have historically imposed the duty to mitigate damages, and
offsetting income earned after the termination of a contract is a form of
mitigation. 285  The concept of double-dipping, or the acceleration of
contractual benefits, is one that is increasingly more common as
representatives recognizing that coaching is a very insecure business want to
insulate their clients financially against a firing that is seemingly inevitable. 286
Most NFL contracts impose offset clauses that apply to all income. Such
provisions do not seem to be broadly enforced outside the NFL, although the
trend may be toward broader enforcement.287 Since assistant coaches seldom
have buyout provisions and their tenure is tied to that of the head coach, such
provisions may not be applicable in the NFL unless specifically negotiated.
The presence of such clauses in collegiate football coaching contracts and the
possibility of double-dipping after termination may make collegiate coaching a
more financially rewarding option.288
Every year there are several arbitrations between NFL clubs and NFL
coaches concerning the offset provision in coaches' contracts. 289 The two
most common arguments made by NFL clubs in these proceedings are that: (1)
the coach failed to undertake the level of effort required by his contract to find
substitute employment (i.e., reasonable or best efforts) and (2) the amount of
salary the coach is currently receiving from his new employer is below market,
resulting in a larger contribution from the former club.290 Frequently, these
disputes are initiated by the coach in response to his former club stopping
installment payments due under the contract. Faced with no, or dramatically
reduced, income and the uncertainty of the Commissioner-appointed
arbitrator's decision, many coaches simply choose to settle claims for a
fraction of their value. 291 One of the principal benefits provided by the
"incredulous" and expressing the hope "we can get beyond this." Id. The stumbling blocked
apparently was the two years remaining on Heimerdinger's contract and what the Jets' liability would
be if he did not obtain equal compensation.
285. See generally Rodgers v. Ga. Tech Athletic Ass'n, 303 S.E.2d 467 (1983).
286. Darren Rovell, The Cost of Changing Coaches, ESPN.COM, Dec. 8, 2003,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1676108 (addressing the increasingly common practice
of acceleration of lump sum buyout provisions for head coaches terminated without cause in the
collegiate ranks).
287. Interview with Pat Kirwan, supra note 23.
288. See Rovell, supra note 286.
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NFLCA to its members is the assistance of counsel, without charge, in these
offset arbitrations.
These arbitrations also invite an examination of the dearth of information
in the NFL coaching market. Should a club claim that its former coach
negotiated a contract below market value with another NFL club, the issue of
determining "market value" becomes paramount. Because detailed contractual
information is necessary to prove such a claim, some clubs may undertake the
arbitration as a subterfuge for obtaining valuable market information (e.g.,
contract terms between other NFL coaches and their clubs) not otherwise at
their disposal. Similarly, from the coaches' perspective, although their yearly
salary surveys constitute more information than the clubs currently enjoy, they
are bereft of much of the detail necessary to make or defend a claim focused
on market value of a given position with a given club. This circumstance is
another compelling reason for NFL clubs and NFL coaches to find permissible
means to a more intelligent market place.
VI. NFL PENSION PLAN
Notwithstanding that very few NFL contracts expressly provide for
pension benefits, every NFL coach that meets minimal eligibility requirements
is entitled to participate in the National Football League Club Employees
Pension Plan ("Plan"). In addition to Plan benefits, some clubs may also offer
a 401(k) savings plan292 or similar retirement benefits. The availability of
these additional retirement benefits should be confirmed or negotiated on a
case by case basis. However, since every NFL coach maintains at least the
opportunity to qualify for Plan benefits and because Plan benefits are
somewhat unique and relatively generous, they are worthy of further
consideration.
A. Background
The Plan provides income to both "coaches and front office employees of
member clubs"293 upon their retirement. The NFL operates a defined benefit
plan, where the pension benefit is "determined in accordance with a formula
292. A 401(k) plan refers to the Internal Revenue Code section after which such plans are named.
In 2006, a coach can contribute $15,000 of his 2006 salary to a 401(k) plan on a pre-tax, tax deferred
basis. I.R.C. § 401(k) (2006).
293. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CLUB EMPLOYEES PENSION
PLAN 1 (1989) (emphasis added) (on file with author). The plan applies to those "employed by a
Member Club of the League other than as a football player." Id. at 4. Employees "remain... active
participant[s] in the Plan until [they] stop[] working for a Member Club of the League." Id. Those
who leave the league will become active participants if they choose to re-join. Id.
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set out in the Plan." 294 Under a defined benefit plan, the benefits are slow to
accrue early in the employee's career; however, they accelerate mid-career.
Member clubs, not individual participants, make contributions to the Plan.295
Moreover, the clubs are responsible for directing the investments within the
Plan.296 Thus, unlike a defined contribution plan, the clubs bear the risk of
their investments, and the employees are guaranteed a defined monthly
payment upon their retirement.297  In addition, a portion or all of the
retirement income can pass to "designated beneficiaries" upon the death of the
retiree. 298
B. Payment Factors
The benefit payment(s) for the Plan are calculated based on three
factors: a coach's (1) compensation, (2) credited service, 299 and (3) age at
retirement. 300 The higher a coach's compensation and years of credited
service, the larger his accrued benefit will be.
i. Compensation
Compensation is measured via three different calculations for purposes of
determining benefits: (1) calendar year compensation, 30 1 (2) covered
compensation, 30 2 and (3) final average compensation. 30 3  Each of the
foregoing compensation components is inserted into a formula to determine a
coach's annual plan benefits. The amount of compensation considered in the
formula is limited by the federal government; currently, the cap is
294. Id. at 1.
295. Id. ("The amount that the Member Clubs contribute to the Plan is determined periodically
by an actuary.").
296. Id. at General Information.
297. Id. at 27.
298. Id. at 20.
299. "Credited service is your total number of Plan Years of employment with the Member Clubs
of the League in which [a member is] credited with at least 1,000 Hours of Service." Id. at 5.
300. Id.
301. A coach's calendar year compensation includes the "total wages or salary as reported on
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") Form W-2, plus tax-deferred contributions to a salary reduction, or
'401(k)', savings plan and any elective contributions under a cafeteria plan." Id.
302. Covered compensation, which is determined by IRS regulations, is the "average of the
Social Security taxable wage bases during the 35 years prior to [a coach's] 'social security retirement
age,' which is age 65, 66, or 67, depending upon the year of [his] birth." Id.
303. Final average compensation is a coach's highest average yearly compensation over a span of
five consecutive calendar years during credited service, no matter when those consecutive years take
place. Id. at 5-6.
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$220,000,304 but it is adjusted annually.
ii. Credited Service
A coach's credited service comprises the "total number of Plan Years
of employment with the Member Clubs of the League in which [he is] credited
with at least 1,000 Hours of Service." 30 5  A plan year runs from April 1
through March 31 306 An hour of service is defined under the Plan as an hour
for which an employee is to be compensated "or entitled to be compensated as
an active employee." 30 7 "This includes not only hours of actual work for a
Member Club, but also hours for which [a coach is] entitled to be paid even
though [he is] not at work. 308
C. Vesting
Under the League's Plan, a coach is not eligible to receive retirement
benefits until he has completed at least three years of vesting service, at which
point the Plan starts to vest.309 Vesting service is equivalent to a year of
credited service. At the end of three years of vesting service, sixty percent of
an employee's benefits have vested meaning the coach is entitled to sixty
percent of his retirement benefits. 310 This rises to eighty percent after four
years. 311 The plan fully vests at the end of five years of employment. 312 A
coach can also become fully vested if he reaches normal retirement age while
being currently employed by a member club. 3 13 Thus, after five years of
vesting service, a coach will be entitled to one hundred percent of his
retirement benefits. This is particularly important for coaches who do not
finish their careers with the NFL. Under the Plan, a member coach never loses
years of vested service.314 Thus, if a member leaves the Plan prior to having
three years of vested service, but later returns, the previous years of vested
304. I.R.C. § 415(d).
305. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 293, at 5.
306. Id. at 3.
307. Id. at 6.
308. Id. This includes "a maximum of 501 hours for any single contiguous period during which
you perform no duties for a Member Club." Id. An employee can also receive credit hours for
"certain military service and back-pay awards." Id.





314. Id. at 15.
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service will be restored to his total.
D. The Formulas
i. Normal Retirement Benefit
Coaches are eligible for "normal retirement benefits" if they retire after
the age of sixty- five.315 Such benefits are paid in monthly installments under
the Plan.316 The Plan provides a somewhat lengthy formula for determining a
coach's annual benefit.317 Two figures, final average compensation and years
of credited service, primarily influence this calculation. The greater a coach's
final average compensation and years of credited service, the larger his annual
benefit will be under the Plan. However, the Internal Revenue Code mandates
that a coach's final average compensation be capped at $220,000 for purpose
of determining benefits under the Plan. 3 18 Thus, if a coach has a final average
compensation of $300,000, $220,000 will be entered into the formula.
A quick example sets forth the impact of the pension cap. Assume current
Seahawks head coach Mike Holmgren retires with a final average
compensation of $5,000,000319 - an amount far surpassing the $220,000 final
315. The full age of retirement can always be adjusted going forward. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 9.
(I) [Coach's] Prior Plan Benefit, if any; plus
(HI) A benefit equal to the greater of
(A) The sum of
(1) 3.5% of [the coach's] Final Average Compensation, multiplied by the lesser of (a)
[his]
years of Credited Service completed after March 31, 1989, or (b) 15; and
(2) 0.5% of [the coach's] Final Average Compensation in excess of Covered
Compensation,
multiplied by the lesser of
a. [his] years of Credited Service completed after March 31, 1989, or
b. The lesser of
i. 35 minus [his] years of Credited Service completed prior to April 1, 1989, or
ii.. 15;
OR
(B) 5.0% of [the coach's] compensation (excluding compensation exceeding $30,000) for
the calendar year ending within each of [his] years of Credited Service beginning after
March 31, 1989.
318. I.R.C. § 415(d) (2006).
319. Coach Holmgren recently extended his contract with the Seattle Seahawks. The two-year
extension to his contract resulted in an average of over seven million dollars per year for the next
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average compensation cap. For purposes of this example, further assume that
Coach Holmgren retires in 2007 at normal retirement age with over fifteen
years of credited service.320  Finally, assume he has no prior benefit plan.
Since his final average compensation is capped, he will only receive an annual
benefit of $128,156.321 Furthermore, even without the final average
compensation cap, Coach Holmgren would still be limited in his annual
benefit under the Plan. The Internal Revenue Code currently limits the annual
payment under a defined benefit plan to $200,000.322
Recognizing that many of its coaches would be limited by the final
average compensation cap, the NFL provides additional retirement benefits to
its coaches via a Supplemental Employee Retirement Plan (SERP). The SERP
allows coaches to collect annual retirement payments in addition to those
generated from the Plan. The gross benefit payable from the SERP is
calculated by using the Plan's formula.
Pursuant to the SERP formula, however, Coach Holmgren's final average
compensation is capped at $315,000323 instead of $220,000. Thus, assuming
all of the same variables from the above example, Coach Holmgren's gross
benefit payable under the SERP would be $185,156.324 The Plan and the
SERP are coordinated so that the net benefit payable from the SERP is equal
to the gross benefit, $185,156, less the benefit payable from the pension plan,
$128,156. This equals $57,000, the added benefit of the SERP. Thus, in our
example, Coach Holmgren will receive an annual benefit of $185,156 -
$128,156 payable from the Plan and $57,000 payable from the SERP.
While the retirement benefits of every post-2000 NFL head coach and
many coordinators are likely to be limited by the compensation caps of both
the Plan and the SERP, some assistant coaches may not tap into the SERP at
all. An example sheds light on this possibility. Coach X, a tight ends coach
for the Atlanta Falcons, has a final average compensation of $150,000. He
three years.
320. In fact, in 2007, Coach Holmgren will be only fifty-nine years old yet will have earned
twenty years of credited service.
321. This number was calculated using the Plan's formula. The variables included final average
compensation ($220,000), years of credited service (15), and covered compensation ($51,254). It was
assumed that Coach Holmgren never received a salary of less than $30,000.
322. I.R.C. § 401(a)(17)(B).
323. As of 2003, the maximum pay allowable under pre-1994 law to qualified plans was
$300,180, commonly known as a 401(a)(17) limit. This figure has subsequently been adjusted given
cost of living adjustments prescribed by I.R.C. § 415(d). It is important to note that a majority of
NFL head and assistant coaches will be severely restricted by the SERP's final average compensation
limitation.
324. This number was calculated using the Plan's formula. The variables included final average
compensation ($315,000), years of credited service (15) and covered compensation ($51,254).
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retires in 2007 at normal retirement age with over fifteen years of credited
service. He has no prior benefit plan. Coach X is under the $220,000
maximum average compensation allowable under the Internal Revenue Code.
His benefits under the plan will amount to $86,155.95.325 Since Coach Xs
final average compensation is below the $220,000 maximum, he will not tap
into any of the SERP's benefits.
Although the SERP provides added benefits on top of the Plan, they are
minimal in comparison to a SERP with no maximum average compensation.
Given the rapid rise in coaching salaries, it is inevitable that without a
modification to the existing retirement plans, more and more coaches'
retirement benefits will eventually be capped as per the Coach Holmgren
example provided above.
ii. Early Retirement Benefits
Coaches also have the option of receiving early retirement benefits at a
reduced rate once they have reached the age of fifty-five and have accrued five
years of credited service.326  These reduced monthly payments remain
constant after a coach's normal retirement date or following the date of
termination. 327  Under the latter scenario, the annual benefit will be a
percentage of the normal retirement benefit (discussed above) determined by
an Early Commencement Table 328 offered under the Plan. Benefits are
reduced for coaches receiving earlier payments because they are expected to
receive more years of benefits than those receiving them at the normal
retirement age.
For example, assume Coach Z, a strength and conditioning coach for a
member team, retires in 2007 at age fifty-seven, eight years ahead of his
normal retirement date. He has served fifteen years in the League and has an
accrued benefit of $82,000. Coach Z wants to begin receiving his payments
after he is terminated. His retirement date would be ninety-six months earlier
than his normal retirement date. Referring to the Early Commencement Table,
the applicable percentage used to discount his accrued benefit is .567. Coach
Z's early retirement benefit equals $46,412 ($82,000 * .567).
325. This number was calculated using the Plan's formula. The variables included final average
compensation ($150,000), years of credited service (15) and covered compensation ($52,254).
326. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 293, at 11.
327. Id.
328. Id. This table is attached. See infra Exhibit 1.
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iii. Other Types of Benefits
The Plan also offers postponed retirement benefits, disability retirement
benefits, deferred vested benefits and death benefits.3 29 Coaches who exercise
the postponed retirement benefits work past the age of sixty-five. 330 These
coaches choose not to receive their benefits until after they reach the normal
retirement age or reach the age of seventy and a half.331 At the age of seventy
and a half, the federal government requires all retirees to receive a minimum
required payment.332  If coaches are "totally and permanently disabled,- 333
they can opt for one of two types of disability retirement benefits. They can
receive a monthly benefit, equal to one-twelfth of their accrued benefit, which
is not actuarially adjusted or reduced. 334 Coaches can also opt for a lump sum
that is actuarially equivalent to their accrued benefit, scheduled to commence
on their normal retirement date.335 Coaches who are not eligible for normal or
early retirement benefits, but who have completed three or more years of
vesting service, 336 can receive a deferred vested benefit. This benefit consists
of "the vested portion of the pension benefit" coaches have earned as of their
termination date. 337 For coaches who have completed at least five years of
credited service, benefits may be received as early as their fifty-fifth
birthday.338  These payments will be adjusted based on the Early
Commencement Table. 339 Finally, if a coach dies after attaining the age of
fifty-five and five years of credited service, his beneficiary "will receive a
329. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 293, at 12-13.
330. Id.
331. Id. For coaches who are still working for a club after the age of seventy and a half and have
begun to receive payments, their benefits, which accrue each plan year, "will be reduced by the
actuarial equivalent of the total benefit distributions made to [them]." Id. at 12.
332. See I.R.C. § 72 (2006).
333. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 293, at 12.
334. Id.
335. Id. This is similar to the adjustment made to the early retirement benefits, which are
calculated using the Early Commencement Table. If this option is chosen,
the benefit will be retroactive to the date of [the employee's] disability and will be payable for life;
provided that if [the employee has] not yet attained [his] Normal Retirement Age, the benefit will
be payable only until [his] disability ceases and only for the period of time that [he] is eligible to
receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act.
Id. at 12-13.
336. This group includes employees who retire before the age of fifty-five but have accrued three
or more years of vesting service.
337. Id. at 13.
338. Id. These payments would begin "on the first day of any month coincident with or next
following [an employee's] 55th birthday." Id.
339. Id.
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single lump sum equal to the value of the participant's earned benefit. 3 40 If
the death instead occurs before the coach has reached age fifty-five, the
beneficiary may be eligible for a benefit depending on the portion of the
accrued benefits that have vested.341
E. Forfeitures and Reemployment
When coaches terminate their employment with a club, the non-vested
portion of their benefits will be forfeited.342 If the coaches have yet to receive
a distribution, they will retain both their years of credited and vesting
service. 343 If terminated coaches have received the entire vested percentage of
their benefit, "all Credited Service credited to [them] at the time of [their]
termination will be forfeited."' 344  An exception exists, however, if the
coaches' benefits have not fully vested. 345
Coaches receiving a benefit under the Plan, but who are later
reemployed by a club, will have their payments stopped during their
reemployment. 346 Once they have re-retired, their pension benefits will be
recalculated. 347 Payments will then resume upon the earlier of the subsequent
retirement or the employee reaching the age of seventy and a half.348 These
benefits "will be actuarially reduced to reflect the value of... previously paid
benefits." 349
F. Forms of Payment
There are two default forms of payment: one for unmarried coaches and
one for married coaches. While unmarried coaches can receive a straight-life
annuity, which pays an equal monthly payment for the rest of their lives,
340. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, SUMMARY OF PLAN PROVISIONS - COACHING 3 (on file with
author).
341. Id. at 3-4.
342. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 293, at 15.
343. Id. An employee's vesting service is always retained.
344. Id.
345. Id. The employee must (1) become an employee of a club within five years of his
termination or (2) "repay the amount of distribution with interest" at "the close of the first period of
[five] consecutive [one]-year breaks in service commencing after [the employee] receive[s] the
distribution."
346. Id.
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married coaches can obtain a "joint and 50% survivor annuity. '350 Under this
latter payment, coaches receive a reduced monthly benefit for their lifetime.351
Upon death, their spouses receive monthly payments "equal to 50% of the
benefit that [the coaches] were receiving." 352 Optional forms of payment353
include a ten-year certain and life annuity,354 lump sum payment, 355 and joint
and 50%, 66-2/3% or 100% survivor annuity.3 56 Married employees must
have their spouse's consent if they choose an optional form of benefit.
357
They must also receive spousal consent if they (1) opt for a payment plan
other than a joint and survivor annuity and (2) wish to receive early retirement
benefits valued at more than $3500.358
While the entire plan is not insured against loss, "certain benefits under
this Plan are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC). ' ' 359 The PBGC is supported by the federal government and was
created as part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 360 Currently
the PBGC will cover up to $3971 a month, but this amount is adjusted
annually. 36
1
350. Id. at 18.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. An employee must submit a written explanation to the Plan Administrator if he chooses
an optional form. Id. at 19. This must be done not more than ninety days prior to the benefit
commencement date. Id. Once payments have begun, an employee may not change his choice. Id.
If an employee dies before payments commence, any options he may have elected prior to death may
be voided, and instead a death benefit may be payable. Id. at 20.
354. Id. at 18. Under this plan, an employee (or his beneficiary) is guaranteed 120 monthly
payments no matter how long he lives. Id.
355. Id. at 19. This involves a single cash payment with large tax implications. It is available to
coaches (1) over the age of sixty-five or (2) over the age of fifty-five with at least five years of
professional experience and no "professional employment in football for at least six months." NAT'L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 340, at 7.
356. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 293, at 19.
357. Id. at 20.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 27.
360. Defined-Benefit Pension Plans: Current Problems and Future Challenges Before S. Comm.
on Finance (2005) (statement of Douglas Holz-Eakin, Dir., PBGC), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/64xx/doc6414/06-07-PBGC.pdf. The PBGC is not officially backed by
the U.S. government. Id. Currently, the future solvency of the PBGC is in question. Id. at 5. Some
argue that the insurer will be completely insolvent by 2013. Id. Even though, as mentioned, the
PBGC was created under government supervision, it is not backed with the "full faith and credit of
the U.S. Government." Id. As such, if the PBGC becomes insolvent, the guarantee could become
worthless unless the treasury intervenes, the occurrence of which is left to political debate beyond the
scope of this article. Id.
361. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables,
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i. Domestic Relations Orders
Coaches who divorce or whose spouses die after electing a form of
payment may revoke that election prior to the benefit commencement date.362
However, domestic relations orders are the exception to the rule.363 A spouse,
former spouse or dependent may have the right "to receive all or part of [a
coach's] benefits under the Plan" if a court order has been issued relating to
"the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property
rights." 364
G. The Rule of 75 - A Pension Bonus
Under the Rule of 75 (Rule), the NFL offers coaches who retire
between the ages of fifty-eight and sixty-five an additional source of benefits
as a holdover prior to their reaching normal retirement age.365 The Rule was
given its name since it applies only to coaches whose age plus years of
credited service, at the end of employment, add up to at least seventy-five. 366
Without the Rule, coaches would have to wait until normal retirement age to
receive their full benefits under the Plan and the SERP. NFL coaches have a
similar opportunity to receive early retirement benefits prior to their normal
retirement date under the Plan; however, these benefits are adjusted by
multiplying their accrued benefit by a percentage in the Early Commencement
Table. 367 Under the Rule, retirees receive a monthly payment equal to their
"total monthly accrued benefit under [the Plan]. ' 368 Besides the qualifications
discussed above, coaches must also meet the following criteria to qualify for
the Rule:
" Have earned at least 10 years of Credited Service while a coach;
" Have earned at least one year of Credited Service during the 2000
Season or later as a coach;
http://www.pbgc.gov/workers-retirees/fmd-your-pension-plan/content/page789.html (last visited Oct.
2, 2006).
362. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 293, at 20.
363. Id. at 25. Domestic relations orders are also an exception to the general rule that benefits
cannot typically be pledged, assigned, borrowed against, or alienated. Id. Benefits are also "not
subject to legal processes such as attachment or garnishment." Id.
364. Id.
365. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, RULE OF 75 PLAN FOR NFL COACHES: SUMMARY OF PLAN
PROVISIONS 1.
366. Id.
367. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 293, at 11 (emphasis added).
368. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 365, at 1 (emphasis added).
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" Have earned at least $125,000 of compensation for each of [their]
last two coaching years of Credited Service;...
" Not have received a lump sum after July 1, 2000 or have begun to
receive a monthly benefit prior to age 65 from the NFL Club
Employees Pension Plan. 369
The intentions of the Rule are clear since it does not allow coaches to
collect from both the Rule and the Plan at the same time. Instead, the Rule
rewards coaches who have served a significant amount of time in the League
by allowing them to start receiving their benefits at age fifty-eight instead of
age sixty-five without having them discounted. A coach worried about
receiving his full benefits does not have to work to the age of sixty-five and
can retire earlier under the Rule, presuming he satisfies all of the necessary
requirements listed above. Once coaches reach the age of sixty-five, the Rule
is no longer applicable, and they will instead receive their benefits through the
Plan.370 Although payments under the Rule will stop if a coach dies before the
age of sixty-five, one can opt for a joint and fifty percent spouse's annuity, in
which case the spouse will receive benefits upon the coach's death.371
H. Retirement Benefits: A Brief Review
While the NFL's defined benefit plan is risky for the NFL's clubs, it
provides steady rewards for the coaches. Under a defined contribution plan,
coaches would direct their own investments, bearing the risks themselves.
Under the Plan and SERP, the NFL is forced to pay the benefits determined by
the formulas irrespective of the investment success of the retirement assets.
As added protection for retirement plan participants, a quasi-governmental
corporation insures these payments. In this respect, the NFL stands apart from
the majority of businesses, which have switched over to defined contribution
plans.
The Plan also provides coaches with a great amount of flexibility. Certain
employees have the option of receiving payments before the normal retirement
age. Others have the option to postpone their benefits. In addition, unlike
most defined benefit plans, the Plan allows the benefits to continually accrue
even if the coach switches clubs. The Plan provides for a variety of ways in
which coaches - regardless of their marital status - can receive payments.
Finally, the League's Plan offers a unique "Rule of 75" feature that
provides incentive for coaches who have been in the league for a while to
369. Id.
370. Id. at 2.
371. Id. at 1.
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continue coaching past'the age of fifty-eight. Instead of forcing coaches to
receive discounted payments under the early retirement plan, the Rule allows
coaches to continue to receive their full benefits under the Plan.
VII. A BETTER INFORMED MARKETPLACE: IS IT POSSIBLE? IS IT
PERMISSIBLE?
A. Current System
Currently, members of the NFLCA receive annual salary surveys that
aggregate salary information for a given coaching position (Salary Surveys -
See Exhibit A and B attached hereto). 372 Attached as Exhibit A to this article
is the 2005 Salary Survey; attached as Exhibit B are the 2006 through 2008
Salary Surveys as of December 1, 2006. The NFLCA's Salary Surveys are
typically completed at the end of the season by the club's designated
representative to the NFLCA. As such, this process necessarily yields
historical data. Conspicuously absent in these reports is salary information for
NFL head coaches. Although the salaries of most NFL head coaches are
widely reported, they are rarely subject to independent verification. This is a
matter of particular importance to coaches and clubs alike, as salaries in the
sports industry are frequently established from the top down. Consequently,
although the salary surveys are a useful tool for NFLCA membership, several
factors further dilute their value. The fundamental challenge to using such
surveys is that they are bereft of sufficient contract details to make specific
comparisons - an exercise at the heart of negotiations for NFL free agent
players. For negotiation purposes, in addition to confirming base salaries and
bonus criteria and payments, it would be helpful for coaches and clubs alike to
know at least the following with which to compare: (1) record or reputation for
results (for the coach and the club); (2) duties required under the contract; (3)
the location of the contracting club for cost of living and tax purposes; and (4)
years of coaching experience.
Coaches and club representatives interviewed in conjunction with this
article, without exception, uniformly recited the benefits of accurate and
specific contract information. Moreover, representatives of each group
expressed no concern that the other group may be privy to the same
372. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COACHES ASS'N, supra note 38 (providing averages, minimums,
maximums and experience levels for the following position (e.g., assistant) coaches: assistant
defensive backs, assistant defensive line, assistant head, assistant offensive line, assistant special
teams, assistant to head coach, defensive backs, defensive assistant, defensive coordinator, defensive
line, linebackers, offensive assistant, offensive coordinator, offensive line, outside linebackers,
quarterbacks, running backs, special teams, strength, strength assistant, tight ends and wide receivers).
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information. In fact, the impetus for this article resulted from several club
representatives' frustrations in negotiating coaching contracts with little
information or a perceived abundance of misinformation.373 In concert with
the club's position regarding a lack of accurate information, the NFLCA also
welcomes the sharing of more specific and accurate information among its
constituents (and with the clubs) as the most valuable means to bolster salaries
and improve contract terms. Satisfying both NFL coaches' and NFL clubs'
desires for more and better coaching contract information requires a careful
analysis of legal options.
B. A Review of Relevant Antitrust Law
United States Supreme Court precedent developed the framework for
identifying the factors that weigh in favor of a determination that sharing
market information is either, on balance, illegal anti-competitive behavior or
permissible pro-competitive activity.374
In the 1925 Supreme Court case Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass 'n. v.
United States,3 75 the defendants were members of an unincorporated
association of twenty-two flooring manufacturer/sellers that, at the time,
produced seventy percent of the United States' output of maple, beech and
birch flooring.376 Association members shared flooring industry information
concerning the average cost of all dimensions and grades of flooring, flooring
freight rates from a central location to approximately 6000 points of delivery,
quality and price information, stock on hand and the rate of sales commissions
paid. 377 Such information was reported to members via weekly written reports
and during regular meetings at which the members discussed industry
trends. 378 Trial court testimony revealed that future prices became the subject
of discussion outside of the regular meetings, notwithstanding the
association's counsel admonishment to members not to discuss future
373. Currently, the NFL clubs do not formally share coaching contract information in any
manner via a trade association or similar vehicle. It is widely rumored, however, that NFL executives
routinely discuss coaching salaries, industry trends and the details of current coaching contract
negotiations. Such inter-club activities are expressly prohibited in the context of negotiating NFL
player contracts and carry severe penalties including the termination of a club's player rights and
fines up to two million dollars. See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 7, art. XXVIII.
374. See, e.g., Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
375. Maple Flooring, 268 U.S. 563.
376. Id. at 565-66.
377. Id. at 566-67.
378. Id.
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prices. 379
Importantly, the record in Maple Flooring was bereft of evidence
establishing that the members reached agreement to produce a given effect on
commerce other than which would normally flow from the association's
activities. 380 In ruling in favor of the defendant association members, the
Supreme Court held that no unlawful restraint of trade occurs as a result of the
natural effect of better informed market participants. 381  Simply put, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the dissemination of pertinent market
information tends to stabilize and produce uniformity of price and practices -
a consequence that, by itself, is not unlawful.382 Significant to the Maple
Flooring Court's decision was the fact that reported and published price
information dealt exclusively with past and closed transactions. 383 Maple
Flooring further confirmed a fundamental tenet of analyzing Sherman Act
cases: "each case ... must be determined upon the particular facts disclosed
by the record" and considered with "a clear recognition of the essential
differences" between the facts of prior decisions and the facts of the case at
bar. 384
Eleven years after its Maple Flooring decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
again addressed the federal government's allegations of price fixing resulting
from the announcement of sugar prices and sales terms among fifteen
members of a trade association of sugar refinery companies. 385 At the time of
the suit, the defendants refined "practically all the imported raw sugar
processed in this country. 38 6 The association adopted a Code of Ethics; its
distinctive feature was "a requirement of adherence, without deviation, to the
prices and terms publicly announced" by the collective membership. 387 The
district court concluded that notwithstanding the association's assertions that
such practices were necessary to remedy a history of deceptive practices in the
sugar industry, such practices were nonetheless an unreasonable restraint of
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 388 In affirming the district
379. Id. at 575.
380. Id. at 577.
381. Id. at 582.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 584. "Competition does not become less free merely because the conduct of
commercial operations becomes more intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge of all the
essential factors entering into the commercial transaction." Id. at 583.
384. Id. at 579.
385. Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
386. Id. at 571-72.
387. Id. at 582.
388. Id. at 592-93.
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court's findings, the Supreme Court condemned the defendants' practice of
compelling compliance to their directives yet expressly accepted the practice
of announcing price information as permissible under the Sherman Act.389
Integral to the trial court and Supreme Court's decision was the fact that sugar
is a standardized commodity 390 and that by collecting and circulating vital data
among only members of the trade association, the defendants obtained an
unfair advantage with respect to purchasers. 391  "[P]rice, not brand, was
always the vital consideration." 392
More recently, the Second Circuit addressed the issue of salary sharing
among a consortium of oil and petrochemical companies that collectively
accounted for eighty to ninety percent of the industry's revenues and which
employed approximately the same percentage of the industry's work force. 393
In Todd v. Exxon Corp.,394 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant oil
companies' salary information practices constituted a violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.395 These practices included: (1) the dissemination of salary
surveys consisting of as few as three companies at a time, and (2) regular
meetings at least three times per year to discuss and exchange salary and
salary related information including the discussion of individual company's
current and future salary budgets for employees.396
Unlike the traditional horizontal conspiracy case that involves an
agreement among sellers, the purpose of which is to raise prices to super-
competitive levels, the Todd court recognized that the Sherman Act also
applies to the abuse of market power on the buyers' side in the form of
monopsony or oligopsony power. 397 The market in Todd was comprised of
buyers (oil companies) who were viewed by sellers (employees) as being
reasonably good substitutes. 398 In this respect, the facts of the Todd case are
similar to the market for coaching jobs in the NFL. Most coaches likely view
NFL clubs as a limited number of relatively fungible employers. And while
the risk to sellers in the context of an oligopsony is that buyers will collude to
389. Id. at 601 ("The unreasonable restraints which defendants imposed lay not in advance
announcements, but in the steps taken to secure adherence, without deviation, to prices and terms thus
announced.").
390. Id. at 600.
391. Id. at 597.
392. Id. at 573.
393. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d. 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2001).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 196-97.
397. Id. at 201.
398. Id. at 202.
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depress prices, the Todd court instructed that "information exchange is not
always anticompetitive and can enhance competition by making competitors
more sensitive to each other's price changes, enhancing rivalry among
them." 399
The Todd court identified two factors as significant to determine whether a
given market is susceptible to the exercise of market power through passive
coordination.400 Susceptible markets tend to include at least the following two
characteristics: (1) highly concentrated markets (i.e., where the defendants
maintain an extremely high market share of information by most measures);
and (2) fungible products subject to inelastic demand.40 1 The foregoing facts
are designed to determine the market price of the defendant. Yet, in making
such a determination, the Second Circuit acknowledged that identifying an
under-inclusive market can be fatal to a plaintiffs claim. In other words, the
availability of alternative employment opportunities outside the defined
market constrains the ability of industry conspirators to limit salary increases
to the point where they become anticompetitive. 40 2 In vacating and remanding
the district court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Todd court
noted that the public dissemination of information is a primary way for data
exchange to realize its pro-competitive potential, yet it was troubled by the
defendants' alleged participation in frequent meetings to discuss future and
current salary information and the confidential treatment of the information
exchanged. 403
A federal court has already considered the antitrust implications of sharing
NFL salary information among members of a trade association.404 In 1992,
each of the NFL clubs joined in a suit against the NFLPA alleging that the
association's agreement to exchange price information (e.g., players' salaries)
with agents was a per se antitrust violation because it evidenced the existence
of a broader conspiracy to fix, raise, stabilize or maintain prices. 405 The clubs'
399. Id. at 214 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1925)).
400. Id. at 208.
401. Id. at 208-09. Inelastic demand is an economic term which means that the level of demand
for a given product or service remains relatively constant irrespective of the available supply of such
product or service.
402. Id. at 204.
403. Id. at 213.
404. Five Smiths, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 788 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Minn.
1992).
405. Id. at 1045. "The per se rule is limited to certain categories of agreements that are so plainly
anticompetitive and lacking in redeeming virtue that they are conclusively presumed to be illegal
without elaborate inquiry into the precise harm that they have caused or their business justifications."
Id. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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complaint further alleged that the salary exchange constituted a rule of reason
violation because it generated the anticompetitive effect of forcing clubs to
pay higher salaries than they would have in the absence of such an
exchange.406 It is important to consider that, at the time of this lawsuit, the
NFLPA had decertified as a union and was operating as a trade association just
as the NFLCA operates today.40 7 In granting the NFLPA's motion to dismiss,
District Court Judge Doty-at that time and to this day the most experienced
judge on matters concerning the NFL and antitrust4 8-ruled that the NFL's per
se409 and rule of reason 410 allegations failed to state viable claims.
The Five Smiths court held that any exchange of salary information
between players or their agents should not be subject to the per se rule because
such an exchange "occurs in an environment where most players are not able
to compete for the same jobs on the same teams."411 The court reasoned that
even assuming some players were competitors, "an exchange of information
among competitors is not within any of the categories of conduct that is so
manifestly anticompetitive as to warrant per se condemnation." 412 Moreover,
the Five Smiths opinion cited ample authority for the proposition that "[t]he
exchange of price data and other information among competitors does not
invariably have anticompetitive effects; indeed such practices can in certain
circumstances increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather
than less, competitive."413  "[T]he unique nature of the business of
406. Five Smiths, 788 F. Supp. at 1045. "In order to state a rule of reason claim under section 1
of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must allege concerted action that is intended to harm or unreasonably
restrain competition and that actually causes such injury to competition." Id. at 1051; Rosebrough
Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1138 (1981).
407. At the time of this lawsuit, the NFLPA had declared itself no longer a labor union-a
negotiation tactic employed to strip the NFL clubs of the nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws.
See Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Minn. 1991).
408. Judge Doty has rendered some of the most important and instructive decisions in the history
of the NFL. See, e.g., white v. Nat'l Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993) (approving
settlement in a class action suit brought by players against the NFL, which effectively eliminated Plan
B free agency, and holding that the settlement agreement was not per se illegal under anti-trust laws;
McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992) (involving an antitrust challenge
to the NFL's Plan B free agency system pursuant to which each of the then twenty-eight NFL clubs
could designate thirty-seven players on its roster as protected players, irrespective of their free agency
status, subject to a right of first refusal/compensation system contained in an expired collection
agreement); Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 764 F. Supp. at 1351. The settlement of the
Powell/McNeil/White trilogy of cases and related ancillary suits spawned the NFL and NFLPA's 1993
Collective Bargaining Agreement - the model for labor peace and posterity in professional sports.
409. Five Smiths, 788 F. Supp. at 1051.
410. Id. at 1055.
411. Id. at 1046.
412. Id. at 1046-47.
413. Id. at 1047 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
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professional football renders it inappropriate to mechanically apply per se
illegality rules." 414
In denying the NFL's rule of reason claim, the court in Five Smiths relied
upon well- settled principles regarding the exchange of price and other market
information.4 15 "Competition does not become less free merely because the
conduct of commercial operations becomes more intelligent through the free
distribution of knowledge of all the essential factors entering into the
commercial transaction." 416
C. The Coaching Market's Susceptibility to Wage Fixing
The history of relevant information sharing cases demonstrates that
markets susceptible to price fixing include standardized or fungible goods or
services and inelastic demand for such goods or services. Neither of these
factors characterizes the market for NFL coaches.
i. NFL Coaches Are Becoming Increasingly Specialized and Unique
Coaches are not fungible. As individuals, that is axiomatic. And, as is
true with most professionals, each coach's nature and level of experience
makes him relatively more or less attractive to NFL clubs considering his hire
among other qualified and available candidates. Similar to the NFL players in
Five Smiths, a given coach's contractual obligations and status under the
NFL's anti-tampering policy virtually assures a unique and different, perhaps
dramatically different, candidate pool from year to year. Finally, in
recognition of the Second Circuit's admonishment against underinclusive
markets for purposes of antitrust review, consideration of the NFL coaching
market must also include at least a portion of coaches from the college ranks,
the Arena Football League, the Canadian Football League and the NFL-
Europe League. Consequently, as sellers in this market, each coach's
Accord Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1137 n. 4 (8th Cir.
1981).
414. Five Smiths, 788 F. Supp. at 1048 n.6 (citing Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d
606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976)).
415. Id. at 1052-53 (citing Sugar Inst. Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936); Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582 (1925)).
416. Maple Flooring, 268 U.S. at 583. In Maple Flooring, the Supreme Court decided that trade
associations which openly and fairly gather and disseminate information regarding the product's cost,
its volume or production, the actual price which the product has brought in past transactions, stocks or
merchandise on hand, approximate cost of transportation from the principal point of shipment to the
points of consumption and meetings to discuss such information and statistics, without however
reaching or attempting to reach any agreement or any concerted action with respect to prices or
production or restraining competition, do not engage in unlawful restraint of trade. Id. at 586.
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experience, skill set, contractual circumstances and professional contacts
create a dynamic mosaic of employment candidates every year.
Perhaps less obvious than the uniqueness of a given coach is the
uniqueness of NFL coaching positions, notwithstanding their titular
similarities. Consider, for example, the position of offensive line coach for the
Cincinnati Bengals. Currently, that position is owned by veteran offensive
line coach Paul Alexander. The Bengals' offensive scheme primarily
incorporates a man blocking design with various trap and combination blocks
coordinated among the offensive linemen, ends and backs. 417 Because the
Bengals maintain a small scouting department, 418 a significant part of Coach
Alexander's job responsibilities include evaluating offensive line talent that
fits the requirements of the Bengals' current offensive blocking scheme. So,
in addition to coaching and teaching his unique style of technique to the
Bengal offensive linemen operating in this scheme, Coach Alexander must
also scout and select linemen with characteristics conducive to success in such
scheme. Such responsibilities virtually eliminate the possibility of an
inexperienced coach landing the offensive line coaching position with the
Bengals.
ii. NFL Clubs' Demand for Coaches Is Not Inelastic
The composition of NFL coaching staffs can be as unique as the men who
occupy such positions. Since 1970, when Coach George Allen hired Coach
Marv Levy as the NFL's first special teams coach, NFL clubs have not only
exponentially expanded the number of positions on their coaching staffs but
also the responsibilities that accompany each position. Currently, nineteen of
the NFL's thirty-two clubs list staffs of eighteen or more assistants. 419
Including strength and conditioning coaches, five clubs maintain assistant
coaching staffs of twenty or more.420 Currently, only three clubs maintain
417. A "man" blocking scheme can be distinguished from a "zone" blocking scheme currently
employed by clubs such as the Broncos and Falcons.
418. The Bengals' website lists four scouts in its scouting department. Cincinnati Bengals, 2006
Staff Directory, http://www.bengals.com/team/frontoffice.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006). Division
rival and most recent Super Bowl Champion Pittsburgh Steelers maintain twice that number.
Pittsburgh Steelers, Front Office, http://media3.steelers.com/team/frontoffice/ (last visited Sept. 22,
2006). The Bengals supplement their scouting efforts by being a member of National Football
Scouting (National). National and BLESTO (an acronym for Bears, Lions, Eagles, Steelers Training
Organization - the founding clubs of this scouting service) are scouting organizations funded and
staffed by individual NFL clubs. Individual scouts from NFL teams are assigned to scout for the
respective organization to which the club belongs.
419. Judy Battista, Hold That Line But Don't Hesitate to Supersize the Coaching Staff, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2006, at DI.
420. Id.
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assistant coaching staffs of fifteen or less;421 one of these abbreviated staffs
belongs to the New England Patriots.422 The advent of free agency and the
ever-increasing complexity of the game spawned the need for so much
division of labor. Because of greater roster turnover, players require more
instruction in new or more challenging offensive or defensive schemes.423
Consequently, each club maintains unique requirements for coaching talent
based on its current coaching staff and player roster. From year to year, some
NFL staffs may remain entirely intact while others will be completely
overhauled, including perhaps the implementation of a new division of labor
between the front office staff and the coaching staff on such hybrid activities
as scouting.
The uniqueness and elasticity of demand for coaches was recently on
display. Consider the 2006 head coaching searches by three members of the
North Division of the NFL's National Football Conference (NFC): the Detroit
Lions, the Green Bay Packers and the Minnesota Vikings. Each one of these
franchises announced the hiring of its new coach within two weeks of the
others, and yet, only two candidates who interviewed with all three clubs were
the same (Coaches Maurice Carthon and Tim Lewis). Neither coach was
ultimately hired by any of the clubs, nor was reported to have been offered
either head coaching job.424 Recognizing that NFL division winners receive
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. During Mike Martz's tenure as head coach of the St. Louis Rams, the club's 260-page
offensive playbook, often referred to as the "War and Peace' Playbook," included an estimated 500
plays with numerous blocking and assignment variations. See Steve Korte, Rams Preparing Wilkins
to Replace Hakim, BELLEVILLE NEwS-DEMOCRAT (Belleville, IL), Aug. 5, 2002, at ID; Leonard
Shapiro, Martz Puts the Ram in Rampage; Coach is Mastermind of Dazzling Offense, WASH. POST,
Nov. 18, 2000, at DOI; Lori Shontz, QB or not QB? Who Knows?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug.
29, 2004, at 4. Similarly, shortly after his move to the Detroit Lions was announced, the Martz
playbook featured 240 passing plays during Detroit's preseason camp. Bernie Miklasz, Haslett,
Martz Face Challenge of Rebuilding Reputations, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 27, 2006, at C 1.
424. Coaching Carousel, PRO FOOTBALL WKLY., Jan. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.profootballweekly.com/PFW/Features/NFL+Features/2006/CoachCarousel.htm. The
Detroit Lions hired Buccaneers assistant head coach and defensive line coach Rod Marinelli on
January 19, 2006. Id. The Lions also interviewed Broncos offensive coordinator Gary Kubiak,
former Saints head coach Jim Haslett, Browns offensive coordinator Maurice Carthon, Steelers
offensive line coach Russ Grimm, Giants defensive coordinator Tim Lewis, Lions interim head coach
Dick Jauron and Forty Niners linebacker coach and assistant head coach Mike Singletary. Id. The
Green Bay Packers hired Forty Niners offensive coordinator Mike McCarthy on January 12, 2006.
Id. The Packers also interviewed Cowboys assistant head coach/passing-game coordinator Sean
Payton (who was ultimately hired weeks later by the New Orleans Saints), Browns offensive
coordinator Maurice Carthon, Bears defensive coordinator Ron Rivera, Chargers defensive
coordinator Wade Phillips, Giants defensive coordinator Tim Lewis and Packers defensive
coordinator Jim Bates. Id. The Minnesota Vikings hired Eagles offensive coordinator Brad Childress
on January 6, 2006. Id. The Vikings also interviewed their then current defensive coordinator Ted
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automatic playoff births, it stands to reason that hiring a coach who could win
the NFC North had to be one of, if not the, most important consideration in the
hiring process. An analysis of the process and results of this intra-division
exercise, concurrently undertaken, bolsters the conclusion that each of these
organizations maintained its own opinion about what it takes to win the NFC
North and which coaches possessed the skills and resources to accomplish that
feat. In other words, each NFL club's perception of a particular coaching
candidate is perhaps more unique than the coach himself. Finally, add to this
dynamic the fact that coaching salaries, unlike those of NFL players, are not
subject to a salary cap,425 and it follows that the market demand for coaches'
services, including their salaries, is relatively more elastic and less price
sensitive than those of NFL players - a group that has already been permitted
to share with its members detailed market information outside the protections
of the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust.426
D. Coaching a Better Game: Intelligent Markets Without Penalties
An aggregate reading of the established precedent in this area coupled
with the realities of the NFL coaching market counsels in favor of clubs and
coaches collectively undertaking the following activities designed to satisfy
each group's need for accurate market information without running afoul of
the Sherman Act.
i. Work Together
Clubs and coaches have less to fear in terms of litigation and much more
to gain if they coordinate their efforts. This action may also immunize either
party from a civil antitrust lawsuit from the other concerning information
sharing. Recognizing that some coaches already share survey information
with their front offices and that only a small percentage of NFL coaching
contracts currently proscribe the dissemination of contract terms, this is a
small step to take relative to its value. Moreover, an analogous procedure for
information sharing has already been established in the context of NFL clubs
and NFL players. 427
Cottrell, Chiefs offensive coordinator Al Saunders and Colts assistant head coach/quarterback coach
Jim Caldwell. Id. The club affiliation of the aforementioned head coaches was as of the date of the
interview. Id.
425. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 7, art. XXIV § 4.
426. See Five Smiths, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 788 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Minn.
1992).
427. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 7, art. XXX, at §§ 1-6. This provision of the NFL's
CBA also provides for a third party "neutral verifier" to confirm the accuracy of shared information.
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ii. Establish a Bipartisan Trade Association
Each year the clubs and coaches could appoint an independent third party
to serve as a repository for NFL coaching contracts. In a joint statement
released by the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (Antitrust
Division) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regarding antitrust in
health care, the use of a "trade association" to serve as a third party to collect
and disseminate survey information is specifically approved.428
iii. Collect and Disseminate Historical Data
The Antitrust Division and FTC recommended that to qualify for an
"antitrust safety zone," wage and price surveys should ask about only wages
paid or prices charged at least three months prior to the date survey
participants complete the survey. Disclosure of current negotiation
information will likely be viewed with a scrutinizing eye by antitrust
regulators and would-be plaintiffs, and surveys of future or projected
compensation are very likely to be considered anticompetitive. The current
timing of the NFLCA's survey works well to comply with this guideline, as
contract information is collected no sooner than the season after the contract is
signed, approximately one year later.
iv. Publish Salaries
It generally is advisable for an association to make its survey results and
other industry research available to both members and nonmembers.
Undoubtedly, this information carries with it enormous public interest.
Consequently, a single press release of historical contract information could
generate enormous coverage across all media and further discount any
anticompetitive advantage enjoyed by a market participant. Although some
coaches may be apprehensive about the public dissemination of their
contract's terms, the media is increasingly reporting such information anyway
(accurately or not), and NFL coaches can take solace in the fact that their
collegiate brethren have been subject to such reporting for years. 429
Id. § 4.
428. See U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Enforcement Policy and
Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (1993). Officials
from the FTC have stated that the principles, while nominally focused on the health care industry, are
broadly applicable to other industries and professions.
429. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966), as amended by Public Law 104-
231, and states' Sunshine Laws require the publishing of contract information for all government
employees.
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v. Avoid Unregulated Discussions of the Results
As the case law in this area amply demonstrates, the problem with salary
and price surveys is not the surveys themselves, but what competitors do with
the information they receive. Thus, the association should discourage
improper discussion of the data bank information and never discuss on-going
or future contract negotiations or terms. Currently, unregulated discussion of
NFL coaches' contract terms is alleged to be rampant. Educating the market,
however, will alleviate the need for such banter. Informed NFL executives
and experienced coach agents need little advice or support to negotiate
employment contracts.
vi. Make Participation Voluntary
Do not require coaches or clubs to contribute to the data bank or prescribe
penalties for non-participation. To be sure, such a policy will require
cooperation among otherwise hyper-competitive participants. Less than total
cooperation could doom the process, however, and the recognition of such dire
consequences is thus likely to secure the program's productive existence.
vii. Commission a Department of Justice Expedited Business Practice Review
The Antitrust Division allows persons seeking business review
determinations to request the same from the Antitrust Division.430 The
Antitrust Division's summary of this process indicates that a proposal to
collect and disseminate business information is one of the two most frequent
types of business review requests. 431 The NFL clubs and coaches must satisfy
the Antitrust Division's request for information and documents necessary to
conduct the review. 432 Although the Antitrust Division will not commit to a
430. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2005).
431. Press Release, Department of Justice, Pilot Program Announced to Expedite Business
Review Process 3 (Dec. 1, 1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicfbusreview/
201659a.pdf.
432. Id. at 7-8. Information sufficient to show:
1. The persons or firms expected to participate in the information exchange;
2. The purposes and objectives of the information exchange;
3. The nature, type, timeliness, and specificity of the information to be exchanged (a sample of all
information to be exchanged should be provided);
4. The method by which the information will be exchanged;
5. The characteristics of the market(s) in which the information will be exchanged, including the
prodcut(s) or service(s) related to the information to be exchanged, the homogeneity of the product(s)
or service(s), the pricing and marketing practices typically employed by firms in the market(s), and
the availability of information concerning market conditions, individual transactions and individual
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rigid deadline for processing reviews, the targeted time frame for resolving
business reviews is within sixty to ninety days of receipt of the request.
433
This process gives the NFL coaches and clubs the opportunity to test the
antitrust waters and make modifications as necessary to establish compliant
practices.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the foregoing course of action may appear to be an enormous
departure from the current system, it must be remembered that: (1) based on
the accounts of market participants, 434 the current system leaves much to be
desired; (2) current practices are not only ineffective, but lead to conduct (i.e.,
discussion of coaches salaries among NFL clubs' executives) that is actionable
under the antitrust laws; and (3) other employment markets have already
implemented practices virtually identical to those prescribed above.
Regarding the last point, the market for lawyers presents a worthy example. If
one considers all sectors of this country's employment markets, it is logical to
conclude that the legal market should be the one most keenly aware of
antitrust restrictions limiting the dissemination of market information. Yet,
ask any third year law student (as such not even a member of the market yet)
the starting salaries for lawyers in their desired location of employment, and
he or she will be able to rattle off more employment information than most of
the subject firms' partners. How? Why?
The legal marketplace works as follows. Typically, a leading firm in a
given geographic market (usually a city) will set a starting salary and then
competitors;
6. The identity and competitive significance (described in terms of market shares, capacities, etc.) of
persons or firms that participate in the relevant product and geographic markets, but will not
participate in the information exchange;
7. The ten largest customers in the relevant geographic market for any product(s) or service(s)
involved in the information exchange and an estimate of their annual purchases;
8. Any safeguards that are planned to prevent disclosure of firm-specific information to competitors;
and
9. Any business synergies, efficiencies or other benefits likely to flow from the venture.
All documents:
1. Reflecting or representing the agreement(s) among the parties to exchange information or the most
recent drafts of such documents; and
2. Discussing or relating to the legality of illegality under the antitrust laws of the information
exchange or the impact of the information exchange on competition or the price of any product or
service.
433. Id. at 4.
434. Larry Keenan indicated that his membership would "celebrate" access to more and better
market information. Telephone Interview with Larry Kennan, supra note 233.
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publicize such salary. Other firms competing for the same level of legal talent
in that geographic market will follow by setting their firm's starting salary at
or near the lead firm's standard. Such a practice is commonly referred to as
conscious parallelism or tacit collusion,435 conduct not in itself unlawful
absent circumstantial evidence tending to demonstrate an agreement to fix
prices.436
For thirty-five years, the National Association of Law Placement (NALP)
has served as an employment information clearinghouse for lawyers based on
cooperation between law schools and employers.437 Although NALP does not
make salary prescriptions for given markets, it reports in considerable detail,
salary and bonus information including the availability of signing bonuses and
formula for calculating performance bonuses, expenses, dues and fee
reimbursements, stipends, parking allowances, and moving expenses.438
NALP also publishes and requires recruiting guidelines for its constituents.
Thus, the legal market is intensely monitored, and its employment terms and
practices are not only disseminated, but in some aspects, prescribed.
While NALP only addresses the parameters for entering into the legal
field, other publications offer information about the continued pay in the
profession. For instance, The American Lawyer publishes an annual survey of
the revenue and pay of the largest one hundred law firms. 43 9 This type of
survey makes the legal profession's compensation practices transparent to
anyone in, or interested in, joining the legal job market.
The current marketplace for NFL coaches is inefficient and
uninformed; it lacks procedures for identifying, collecting and disseminating
important and comprehensive information. And, at least in the case of NFL
clubs, its customs are ripe for antitrust scrutiny. NFL coaches and NFL clubs
should and can implement tested practices for creating a more efficient and
better informed market for coaches. The results of this exercise will benefit
435. Conscious parallelism "describes the process ... by which firms in a concentrated market
might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive
level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price
and output decisions." Brooke Group LTD v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
227 (1993). For a comprehensive analysis of conscious parallelism see Donald F. Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75
HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962).
436. The uniformity of starting salaries among top law firms in a given city eliminates
coincidence as a cause.
437. NALP, Full Text of NALP Principles & Standards, http://nalp.org/content/index.php?pid
-16 (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
438. See Press Release, NALP, Entry Level Lawyer Salaries Remarkably Stable, available at
https://www.nalp.org/store/details.php?prod id=i 10.
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COACHING IN THE NFL
EXHIBIT B
2006 PRELIMINARY SALARY SURVEY (JUNE 2006)
Secondary Salary (in
Position Pos Exp Year thousands)
DB Asst 7 2006 $235
DB Asst 7 2006 $185
DB Asst (Sfty) 6 2006 $145
DL Asst 0 2006 $125
DL Asst 0 2006 $125
AsstHC 17 2006 $2300
AsstHC 18 2006 $700
Asst HC QB 6 2006 $425
OL Asst HC 7 2006 $400
OL Asst HC 15 2006 $400
OL Asst 1 2006 $200
OL Asst 0 2006 $185
OL Asst 1 2006 $185
OL Asst 3 2006 $170
OL Asst 1 2006 $150
OL Asst 3 2006 $150
OL Asst 5 2006 $125
OL Asst 2 2006 $110
OL Asst 2 2006 $105
ST Asst 1 2006 $185
ST Asst 15 2006 $125
ST Asst 4 2006 $120
ST Asst 1 2006 $110
ST Asst 8 2006 $110
ST Asst 1 2006 $110
ST Asst 4 2006 $100
ST Asst 1 2006 $80
ST Asst 1 2006 $80
ST QC 1 2006 $100
HC Asst 4 2006 $210
HC Asstto 4 2006 $210
DB 10 2006 $625
DB 20 2006 $400
DB 5 2006 $325
DB 5 2006 $300
2006]
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DB 13 2006 $275
DB 11 2006 $265
DB 2 2006 $255
DB 11 2006 $215
DB 11 2006 $215
DB 5 2006 $155
Def Asst 6 2006 $115
Def Asst 1 2006 $96
Def Asst 2 2006 $90
Def Asst 3 2006 $90
Def 6 2006 $550
Def 19 2006 $550
DefCoor 19 2006 $1000
DefCoor 12 2006 $1000
DefCoor 7 2006 $600
DefCoor 9 2006 $500
DefCoor 10 2006 $500
DefCoor 9 2006 $500
Def Coor 5 2006 $400
DL 2 2006 $300
DL 5 2006 $290
DL 19 2006 $265
DL 12 2006 $260
DL ST 7 2006 $250
DL 11 2006 $245
DL 12 2006 $235
DL 7 2006 $220
DL 2 2006 $210
LB Asst 2006 $140
LB Asst (M) 1 2006 $125
LB 20 2006 $400
LB 10 2006 $340
LB 8 2006 $335
LB 21 2006 $265
LB 2 2006 $255
LB 2 2006 $250
LB 2 2006 $240
LB 7 2006 $225
LB 1 2006 $215
LB 3 2006 $100
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WR 17 2006 $300
WR 5 2006 $265
WR 14 2006 $375
WR 7 2006 $250
WR 1 2006 $300
WR 13 2006 $235
WR 0 2006 $200
Consult. 24 2006 $500
9 2006 $250
3 2006 $500
